Welcome to Meta-ethics!
In your study of Moral Philosophy so far, you have looked at Normative Ethics (like Utilitarianism or Kantian Ethics), which asks "What should I do?" or "Which actions are right?".
Meta-ethics is different. It doesn’t ask which actions are right; it asks what "right" actually means. It is the "philosophy of ethics." We are stepping back to look at the foundations of moral language. Think of it like this: Normative ethics is like playing a game of football and arguing over the rules; Meta-ethics is asking "What even is a 'rule' and do they actually exist?"
Don't worry if this seems a bit "heady" at first! We will break it down into the two main camps: those who think moral facts are real (Realists) and those who don't (Anti-realists).
1. The Big Divide: Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism
Before we dive into specific theories, we need to understand the two ways philosophers view moral language.
Cognitivism
Cognitivists believe that when we make a moral statement (like "Stealing is wrong"), we are expressing a belief. Beliefs can be true or false (this is called being "truth-apt"). For a cognitivist, moral claims are like scientific claims—they are trying to describe the world.
Non-Cognitivism
Non-cognitivists argue that moral statements are not beliefs. They aren't trying to describe facts, so they cannot be true or false. Instead, they might be expressions of emotion, orders, or social attitudes.
Quick Review Box:
• Cognitivism: Moral claims = Beliefs = Can be True/False.
• Non-Cognitivism: Moral claims = Not Beliefs = Cannot be True/False.
2. Moral Realism (The "Facts" Crowd)
Moral Realism is a cognitivist view. Realists believe that there are mind-independent moral properties or facts in the world. Just like "The sky is blue" is a fact, "Murder is wrong" is a fact for a realist.
Moral Naturalism
Naturalists believe moral properties are just natural properties that we can discover through observation or science.
Example: A Utilitarian might say "Good" is simply "Pleasure." Since we can see and measure pleasure in the natural world, "Good" is a natural fact.
Moral Non-Naturalism (Intuitionism)
G.E. Moore argued that naturalists make a mistake. He said you cannot define "Good" using natural terms like "pleasure" or "happiness." This is known as the Naturalistic Fallacy.
The Open Question Argument: Moore says if "Good" really meant "Pleasure," then asking "Is pleasure good?" would be a silly, closed question like asking "Is a bachelor an unmarried man?". But "Is pleasure good?" feels like a real, open question. Therefore, "Good" and "Pleasure" cannot be the same thing.
Moore’s solution? Intuitionism. He says "Good" is a simple, non-natural property that we just "know" through a special moral intuition.
Analogy: You can't explain the color "yellow" to a blind person by defining it; you just have to see it. Moore says "Good" is just like "Yellow"—it's indefinable but recognizable.
Key Takeaway: Realists think moral facts exist. Naturalists say they are physical/natural facts; Non-naturalists (like Moore) say they are unique, non-physical facts we know by intuition.
3. Issues for Moral Realism
Some very famous philosophers, like David Hume and A.J. Ayer, had big problems with the idea of moral facts.
Hume’s Fork
Hume argued that there are only two types of meaningful statements:
- Relations of Ideas: (Analytic) Things like 2+2=4.
- Matters of Fact: (Synthetic) Things we can see or test, like "It is raining."
The Is-Ought Gap
Hume noticed that people often describe how the world is and then suddenly jump to saying how it ought to be.
Example: "People enjoy eating meat, so we ought to eat meat."
Hume says this is a logical error. You cannot move from a fact (is) to a value (ought) without a proper explanation.
Mackie’s Argument from Queerness
John Mackie (who is an anti-realist) says that if moral facts actually existed, they would be incredibly "queer" (meaning strange or weird).
- Epistemic Queerness: If these facts existed, we’d need a "magic" faculty (intuition) to see them, which is unlikely.
- Metaphysical Queerness: Usually, facts don't tell us what to do. The fact "the sun is a star" doesn't motivate me. But moral facts are supposedly "built-in" with "must-do-ness." Mackie finds this too strange to be true.
4. Moral Anti-Realism (The "No Facts" Crowd)
Anti-realists believe there are no mind-independent moral properties. When we talk about morality, we are doing something other than stating facts.
Error Theory (John Mackie)
Mackie is a cognitivist but an anti-realist. This is a unique combo!
He says: When we make moral statements, we try to state facts (Cognitivism), but because there are no moral facts in the world, we are always wrong.
Analogy: It’s like talking about fairies. If I say "The tooth fairy is kind," I am making a statement that is technically false because there is no tooth fairy.
Emotivism (A.J. Ayer)
Ayer is a non-cognitivist. He uses the Verification Principle: a statement is only meaningful if it is a tautology (analytic) or can be proven true/false by experience (synthetic).
Since moral statements can't be proven, they are meaningless in terms of facts. Instead, they are just expressions of emotion.
The "Boo/Hurrah" Theory:
"Stealing is wrong" = "Boo to stealing!"
"Giving to charity is good" = "Hurrah for charity!"
Prescriptivism (R.M. Hare)
Hare argued that moral language isn't just "Boo" or "Hurrah." Instead, it is prescriptive—it tells people how to act.
When I say "Stealing is wrong," I am actually saying "Do not steal!". Moral statements are like commands that we think should apply to everyone (universalizability).
Key Takeaway: Anti-realists say there are no moral facts. Mackie says we are mistaken when we speak morally; Ayer says we are just venting feelings; Hare says we are giving universal orders.
5. Issues for Moral Anti-Realism
If there are no moral facts, we run into some tricky problems:
- Can we have moral disagreement? If I say "Boo to X" and you say "Hurrah to X," we aren't actually disagreeing about a fact; we just have different feelings. This makes moral debate seem a bit pointless.
- Moral Progress: We usually think society has "improved" (e.g., by abolishing slavery). But if there is no objective "Good" fact to move toward, how can we say we have made "progress"? It would just be a "change" in taste, not an "improvement."
- Moral Nihilism: If there are no moral facts, does that mean "anything goes"? If nothing is really wrong, why bother being good? Anti-realists have to work hard to explain why morality still matters to us even if it isn't "factual."
Did you know? Emotivism was often criticized for making ethics "shouting matches." If I’m just saying "Boo!", I’m not really giving you a reason to change your mind—I’m just trying to influence your feelings.
Summary Checklist
Don't forget these key terms for your exam:
- Cognitivism: Moral claims express beliefs (can be true/false).
- Moral Naturalism: Moral facts are natural facts (like pleasure).
- Naturalistic Fallacy: Trying to define "good" as a natural property (Moore says no!).
- Intuitionism: We know moral truths through a non-natural faculty.
- Error Theory: We try to speak of moral facts, but we are always mistaken.
- Emotivism: Moral claims are just expressions of emotion ("Boo/Hurrah").
- Prescriptivism: Moral claims are universal commands/recommendations.