2025 CCEA AS-Level Religious Studies 4610 Practice Paper with Answers

A strong answer will demonstrate secure knowledge and understanding across the following areas, expressed in a structured, accurate manner:

Origins and historical development: natural moral law is rooted in Aristotelian teleology (the idea that everything has a purpose, telos) and was developed into a Christian ethical system principally by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century; Aquinas argued that God has built a rational moral order into creation which humans, as rational beings, can discern through the use of reason ('the rational creature's participation in the eternal law'); the theory therefore claims to be accessible to all people through reason, not solely through revelation, giving it a universal, absolutist character; candidates may also note Stoic and Old Testament roots, and later restatement in official Roman Catholic moral teaching (e.g. in areas such as Humanae Vitae).

Principles and key features: the synderesis rule ('do good and avoid evil') as the first self-evident principle of practical reason; the primary precepts derived from this — self-preservation, reproduction and the education of offspring, living in an ordered society, worshipping God/seeking knowledge of God, and the pursuit of knowledge/truth; secondary precepts as specific rules derived by applying the primary precepts to particular situations (e.g. 'do not commit adultery' derived from the precept to order society and protect the family); the distinction between real and apparent goods, whereby an action might appear to satisfy a precept while in fact violating right reason; the theory's absolutist, deontological character — actions are assessed as intrinsically right or wrong according to whether they accord with the primary precepts, not primarily by their consequences; the doctrine of double effect, which permits an action with a foreseen bad side-effect provided the act itself is good or neutral, the bad effect is not the means to the good effect, and there is a proportionate reason for permitting it (used, for example, to justify pain relief that may hasten death, provided the intention is pain relief and not killing).

Proportionalism: a later, more flexible development of natural law (associated with thinkers responding to Aquinas's rigid absolutism) which retains the idea of objective moral principles derived from natural law but allows that, in weighing up an action, one may proportionately balance the good and bad effects and, in exceptional circumstances, act against a secondary precept if there is a proportionate reason to do so, while still holding some precepts as inviolable; this represents an attempt to make natural law more responsive to complex real cases without collapsing entirely into consequentialism.

A full answer will present this material in a clear, well-organised way, using accurate terminology throughout and showing secure knowledge of the theory's structure (primary/secondary precepts, real/apparent goods, double effect, proportionalism) without straying into evaluation, which belongs to part (b).

[25 marks, AO1] Marked in levels using the generic AO1 band descriptors: Band 1 (0–5): fragmented or largely inaccurate knowledge, little relevant content; Band 2 (6–10): some accurate but limited knowledge, underdeveloped explanation, little use of specialist vocabulary; Band 3 (11–15): reasonably accurate and relevant knowledge with adequate explanation of most key features (precepts, double effect) though not fully developed; Band 4 (16–20): accurate, well-detailed and mostly comprehensive knowledge, precepts and double effect clearly explained, good use of specialist vocabulary and generally accurate written expression; Band 5 (21–25): comprehensive, precise and confidently expressed knowledge covering origins, primary/secondary precepts, real/apparent goods, double effect and proportionalism, fluent use of specialist vocabulary, well-structured and accurate written communication throughout. Accept any accurate, relevant material on natural law's origins, principles or later development; credit precise use of terms such as synderesis, primary/secondary precepts, telos and double effect.

A strong response will construct a sustained, justified argument, weighing evidence on both sides before reaching a supported conclusion. Indicative lines of argument include:

Case that natural law is more helpful: it offers clear, consistent, universal guidance that does not vary from situation to situation, giving moral certainty and protecting against the dangers of subjective or self-serving judgement; because its precepts are derived from reason and claim universal validity, it can be applied and defended across cultures and does not depend on a particular religious community's judgement of what love requires 'in the moment'; the doctrine of double effect and, in its later proportionalist form, the theory shows some capacity to handle hard cases (e.g. justifying pain-relieving treatment that may hasten death) without abandoning objective principles altogether; it also provides a check against the practical difficulty, in situation ethics, of predicting which action will truly be 'the most loving thing to do' under pressure or with imperfect information.

Case that situation ethics is more helpful: Joseph Fletcher's theory, grounded in the Christian command to love (agape) and the New Testament emphasis on Jesus's own flexible, person-centred treatment of the law (e.g. his engagement with the woman caught in adultery, or his statement that 'the sabbath was made for man, not man for the sabbath'), is responsive to the particulars of real, complex situations in a way that a fixed set of precepts cannot be; Fletcher's four working principles (pragmatism, relativism, positivism, personalism) and six propositions (e.g. 'only one thing is intrinsically good, namely love, nothing else') place people and their wellbeing, rather than abstract rules, at the centre of moral decision making, which many see as closer to the spirit of Christian ethics than natural law's sometimes rigid legalism; situation ethics can therefore avoid the natural law problem of a precept generating outcomes that seem, in a particular case, deeply unloving (e.g. an absolute prohibition producing evident harm).

Weaknesses/counter-considerations: situation ethics has been criticised (e.g. by Robinson-era critics and later scholars) for being dangerously subjective, since 'the most loving thing to do' can be used to rationalise almost any action, and for placing excessive trust in the individual's judgement in the moment, especially under emotional pressure; natural law has been criticised for being inflexible and for resting on a contestable, teleological view of human nature (the claim that acts have a single 'natural' purpose) that critics regard as an outdated or unproven premise, and for producing conclusions (for example in some areas of medical and sexual ethics) that many regard as harsh or impractical in modern contexts.

Justified conclusion: a good answer reaches and defends a personal judgement — for example, that natural law offers superior consistency and protection against self-serving reasoning, while situation ethics better honours the person-centred spirit of Christian love but risks moral relativism, so that a case could be made either way depending on which value (certainty/objectivity versus flexibility/compassion) is weighted more highly, with the strongest answers explicitly justifying why their chosen priority is the more defensible one.

[25 marks, AO2] Marked in levels using the generic AO2 band descriptors: Band 1 (0–5): assertion with little or no justification, no clear line of argument; Band 2 (6–10): some evaluative comment but underdeveloped, limited justification, one-sided or thin coverage of both theories; Band 3 (11–15): a reasonably sustained argument referring to both natural law and situation ethics, with some justification of the view reached, though not always well balanced or fully developed; Band 4 (16–20): a well-argued, reasonably balanced evaluation with clear justification, good use of evidence/examples on both sides, sound understanding of key strengths/weaknesses; Band 5 (21–25): a sophisticated, well-structured and thoroughly justified evaluation, showing sustained critical engagement with both theories, weighing evidence with precision and reaching a clearly justified, defensible conclusion, fluent and accurate written expression throughout. Accept any well-justified conclusion, whichever side is favoured, provided it is properly supported by argument and evidence relating to both theories.

A strong answer will demonstrate secure knowledge and understanding across the following areas:

Definitions and distinctions: euthanasia is generally defined as the intentional ending of a life to relieve suffering; candidates should distinguish voluntary euthanasia (at the patient's own request), non-voluntary euthanasia (where the patient cannot express a wish, e.g. in a persistent vegetative state) and involuntary euthanasia (against the patient's wishes, generally regarded as a form of killing rather than mercy); and the distinction between active euthanasia (a deliberate act that ends life, e.g. administering a lethal dose) and passive euthanasia (withholding or withdrawing treatment, allowing death to occur naturally), together with the further concept of physician-assisted suicide/dying, where a doctor provides the means but the patient performs the final act.

Sanctity of life versus quality of life: the sanctity of life principle, rooted in the belief that human life is a gift from God and made in the imago Dei, holds that all human life has intrinsic, inviolable worth regardless of its circumstances, so that deliberately ending it is always wrong; this is contrasted with quality of life arguments, which hold that when suffering becomes severe and irreversible, continuing to preserve biological life may no longer serve the patient's genuine wellbeing, and that a compassionate ethic should permit ending life in such extreme cases.

Autonomy and personhood: secular and increasingly some religious voices emphasise personal autonomy — the right of a competent individual to make decisions about their own body, suffering and manner of death — as a fundamental value that should be respected even where it conflicts with sanctity of life; this connects to the wider personhood debate about whether the right to self-determination over one's dying should outweigh a general duty to preserve life.

The acts and omissions doctrine: the moral (and legal) distinction between actively killing a patient and merely allowing them to die by withholding or withdrawing treatment; supporters argue there is a real moral difference between doing and allowing, while critics argue the distinction is often practically and morally artificial, since the intended outcome (the patient's death) may be identical.

The doctor–patient relationship and trust: concerns that legalising euthanasia could damage patients' trust that doctors are committed solely to preserving life and relieving suffering, particularly for vulnerable, elderly or disabled patients who might feel pressured, whether explicitly or through a sense of being a burden.

The slippery slope argument: the concern that permitting euthanasia in narrowly defined, compassionate circumstances (e.g. terminal illness, unbearable pain, free and informed request) could gradually extend, through incremental legal and social change, to less clearly justified cases (e.g. non-terminal conditions, mental illness, or pressure on the vulnerable), so that the initial safeguards erode over time.

[25 marks, AO1] Marked in levels using the generic AO1 band descriptors: Band 1 (0–5): fragmented or largely inaccurate knowledge; Band 2 (6–10): some accurate but limited/underdeveloped knowledge of the issues; Band 3 (11–15): reasonably accurate and relevant knowledge of several key issues (e.g. types of euthanasia, sanctity/quality of life) though not comprehensive; Band 4 (16–20): accurate, well-detailed knowledge covering most of the key issues (definitions, sanctity/quality of life, autonomy, acts/omissions, slippery slope) with good use of specialist vocabulary; Band 5 (21–25): comprehensive, precise, confidently expressed knowledge covering the full range of issues, fluent use of specialist vocabulary, accurate and well-structured written communication. Accept any accurate, relevant material on the ethical issues surrounding euthanasia.

A strong response will construct a sustained, justified argument that explicitly engages with other aspects of human experience alongside the religious and philosophical material. Indicative lines of argument include:

Case that sanctity of life should always outweigh autonomy: if human life is understood as a gift from God, of infinite and equal worth because all people are made in the image of God, then no human being — including the sufferer themselves — has the moral authority to decide that a life is no longer worth living; permitting autonomy to override sanctity of life risks devaluing the lives of the seriously ill, elderly or disabled, and could subtly shift social attitudes towards seeing such lives as more expendable (connecting to the slippery slope concern); many faith traditions hold that suffering, while never desired, is not something a human being has authority to end deliberately, since ultimate authority over life and death belongs to God alone.

Case that autonomy should be given great weight: secular human rights thinking holds that the right to bodily self-determination, including decisions about one's own suffering and manner of dying, is a fundamental expression of human dignity, not something that should be automatically subordinated to a religious principle that not all citizens in a pluralist society share; direct human experience of accompanying loved ones through prolonged, painful terminal illness — a recurring feature of public debate on this issue, reflected in personal testimony to legislators, medical case studies and campaigning by patient groups — is frequently invoked to argue that compassion for unbearable, irreversible suffering can outweigh an abstract principle when the dying person, of sound mind, freely and persistently requests help to die; the medical/legal aspect of human experience is also relevant, since doctors already exercise judgement in balancing patient wishes against clinical duty (e.g. through advance decisions and 'do not resuscitate' orders), suggesting some degree of autonomy is already accepted within existing practice.

Balancing and other aspects of human experience: candidates should draw explicitly on aspects of human experience beyond scripture and doctrine — for example, philosophical debate about the meaning of personhood and dignity, the psychological experience of loss of control and dependency that often accompanies terminal illness, sociological evidence about how legalisation has operated where introduced, and the lived experience of families and healthcare professionals — to enrich and test the theological claim; a strong answer might argue that the sanctity of life principle retains a vital role in protecting the vulnerable and resisting a purely utilitarian calculus of worth, but that in narrowly defined cases of unbearable, terminal suffering with a clear, sustained and informed request, a more compassionate, autonomy-respecting approach need not be seen as wholly incompatible with valuing life, since it can be framed as respecting the dignity of the dying person rather than devaluing life itself.

Justified conclusion: the strongest answers reach a clear, defensible personal judgement (for example, that sanctity of life should generally take priority as a safeguard against harm to the vulnerable, but that some weight must be given to autonomy in exceptional, well-evidenced cases, or conversely that respect for autonomy is the more defensible foundation for a compassionate ethic) and justify that judgement by explicit, integrated reference to both the religious material and other aspects of human experience discussed above.

[25 marks, AO2] Marked in levels using the generic AO2 band descriptors, with the mandatory threshold rule: candidates must engage with other aspects of human experience, where necessary, to access Bands 3–5. Band 1 (0–5): assertion with little or no justification, no engagement with other aspects of human experience; Band 2 (6–10): some evaluative comment but underdeveloped, little or no reference to other aspects of human experience; Band 3 (11–15): a reasonably sustained argument with some explicit engagement with other aspects of human experience (e.g. autonomy/rights, personal or medical experience of dying), though not always well balanced; Band 4 (16–20): a well-argued, reasonably balanced evaluation integrating other aspects of human experience effectively alongside religious material, sound justification of the view reached; Band 5 (21–25): a sophisticated, well-structured and thoroughly justified evaluation, showing sustained critical engagement with sanctity of life, autonomy and a well-integrated range of other aspects of human experience, reaching a clearly justified, defensible conclusion, fluent and accurate written expression throughout. Accept valid alternatives; mark in levels.