2026 Cambridge IAS-Level Law (9084) Practice Paper with Answers

The three main forms of delegated legislation in the English legal system are:
1. Orders in Council – drafted by the government and approved by the monarch and Privy Council.
2. Statutory Instruments – created by government ministers and departments under authority granted by an enabling Act.
3. Bylaws (or By-laws) – enacted by local government authorities or public corporations to regulate local matters or public services.

Award 0.5 marks for each correct form identified up to a maximum of 1.5 marks:
- Orders in Council [0.5]
- Statutory Instruments [0.5]
- Bylaws / By-laws [0.5]

A judge in the English legal system can avoid following a previous precedent using the following mechanisms:
1. Distinguishing – demonstrating that the material facts of the current case are sufficiently distinct from the facts of the earlier case so that the previous ratio decidendi does not apply.
2. Overruling – where a higher court declares that a principle of law laid down in an earlier, separate case was wrongly decided.
3. Reversing – where an appellate court overturns the specific decision reached by a lower court in the very same case.

Award 0.5 marks for each correct method identified up to a maximum of 1.5 marks:
- Distinguishing [0.5]
- Overruling [0.5]
- Reversing [0.5]

Judges apply three established rules of language (linguistic presumptions) to assist in discerning the meaning of statutory wording:

1. Ejusdem generis ('of the same kind'): Where general words follow a list of two or more specific words, the general words are interpreted to include only things of the same nature or category as the specific words. For example, in Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse (1899), the phrase 'house, office, room or other place' was held to apply only to indoor betting places because the specific words formed a class of indoor locations, excluding an outdoor racecourse ring.

2. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ('the express mention of one thing excludes others'): Where a statute contains a specific list of items not followed by general words, items not included in the list are presumed to have been intentionally excluded by Parliament. For example, in Tempest v Kilner (1846), a statute referring to 'goods, wares and merchandise' was held not to cover stocks and shares as they were omitted from the specific list.

3. Noscitur a sociis ('a word is known by the company it keeps'): Words in a statute must take their meaning from their immediate statutory context and surrounding words. For example, in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Frere (1965), the phrase 'interest, annuities or other annual sums' was interpreted such that 'interest' meant annual interest only, because of the surrounding references to 'annual' payments.

Point-based marking (Max 6 marks):

- Ejusdem generis: 1 mark for basic definition (general words take meaning from preceding specific words / of the same kind) + 1 mark for elaboration, requirement of a category/class, or relevant case example (e.g., Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse / Hobbs v CG Robertson Ltd) [Max 2 marks].
- Expressio unius exclusio alterius: 1 mark for basic definition (mention of one thing excludes another / specific list without general words) + 1 mark for elaboration or relevant case example (e.g., Tempest v Kilner / R v Inhabitants of Sedgley) [Max 2 marks].
- Noscitur a sociis: 1 mark for basic definition (words interpreted in the context of surrounding words / known by company it keeps) + 1 mark for elaboration or relevant case example (e.g., IRC v Frere / Muir v Keay) [Max 2 marks].

Note: Award a maximum of 4 marks if only definitions are given with no examples or detailed development.

Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and Code C of the Codes of Practice, a person held in custody has several statutory safeguards:

1. Right to have someone informed of arrest (s56 PACE):
A detainee is entitled to have one friend, relative, or other person known to them informed of their arrest and detention at the police station without delay. This right can only be delayed for up to 36 hours where the suspect is detained for an indictable offence and an officer of at least the rank of superintendent authorizes the delay on specific statutory grounds (e.g., risk of harm to evidence, alerting accomplices, or hindering recovery of property).

2. Right to free legal advice (s58 PACE):
A detained person has the right to consult privately with a solicitor in person or via telephone at any time, free of charge through the Duty Solicitor Scheme. Access may only be delayed in exceptional circumstances involving an indictable offence with authorization from a superintendent.

3. Right to consult the PACE Codes of Practice:
The custody officer must inform the detainee of their right to inspect the PACE Codes of Practice (specifically Code C regarding detention, treatment, and questioning) at the police station. (Alternatively, candidates may describe the right to an appropriate adult for juveniles/vulnerable suspects, or rights relating to physical treatment such as clean conditions, regular meals, and 8 hours of uninterrupted rest).

Point-based marking (Max 6 marks):

Award up to 2 marks for each of three clearly explained rights (2 marks x 3 = 6 marks):

- Right to have someone informed of arrest (s56 PACE): 1 mark for identifying the right; 1 mark for statutory details (e.g., friend/relative, delays permitted only for indictable offences on superintendent's authority, max 36 hours) [Max 2 marks].
- Right to free legal advice (s58 PACE): 1 mark for identifying the right to consult a solicitor privately; 1 mark for statutory details (e.g., free via Duty Solicitor Scheme, delay only for indictable offences on superintendent's authority) [Max 2 marks].
- Right to inspect PACE Codes of Practice / Right to an Appropriate Adult / Right to adequate rest and medical attention (PACE Code C): 1 mark for identifying the right; 1 mark for explanation/application details (e.g., appropriate adult mandatory for under 18s or vulnerable adults, 8 hours continuous rest in 24 hours, custody officer record) [Max 2 marks].

Note: Maximum 3 marks if rights are merely listed without statutory context or procedural detail.

### Indicative Content

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding
- Parliamentary Controls:
- The Parent/Enabling Act: Parliament sets out the boundaries, scope, and procedures in the primary legislation (e.g. under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006).
- Affirmative Resolution Procedure: Statutory Instruments (SIs) must be formally approved by Parliament within a specific period before becoming law.
- Negative Resolution Procedure: The SI automatically becomes law unless challenged/annulled within 40 days (most common method).
- Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments (Scrutiny Committee): Reviews technical aspects, drafting defects, and whether legislation imposes a tax or appears ultra vires, though it cannot alter or reject the policy/merit of the statutory instrument.
- Judicial Controls:
- Judicial Review in the High Court (Administrative Court) on the basis of ultra vires (acting beyond power).
- Procedural Ultra Vires: Failure to follow mandatory pre-drafting procedural requirements laid down in the parent Act (e.g. Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd [1972]).
- Substantive Ultra Vires: Exercising powers beyond those granted by the parent Act (e.g. Customs and Excise v Cure & Deeley Ltd [1962]; R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex parte Association of Metropolitan Authorities [1986]).
- Wednesbury Unreasonableness: Making an order so unreasonable that no reasonable public body could have made it (e.g. Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948]; Strickland v Hayes Borough Council [1896]).

AO2: Analysis and Application & AO3: Evaluation
- Evaluation of Parliamentary Controls:
- Strengths: Direct democratic oversight; enabling Acts define strict boundaries from inception; affirmative resolution ensures mandatory debate for contentious matters.
- Limitations: Overwhelming volume of delegated legislation (often 3,000+ SIs annually) makes thorough scrutiny difficult; negative resolution often passes with little or no parliamentary debate; scrutiny committees have no power to amend or reject instruments on policy grounds; executive dominance and government whips mean negative resolutions rarely succeed.
- Evaluation of Judicial Controls:
- Strengths: Independent judiciary willing to declare orders invalid; protects individual rights and rule of law against executive overreach.
- Limitations: Retrospective (can only be challenged after enactment); requires an affected claimant with locus standi (standing); expensive and time-consuming; judges cannot act on their own initiative; ministers can draft parent Acts in very wide ('Henry VIII') clauses to bypass substantive challenges.

Conclusion:
While both mechanisms establish crucial constitutional safeguards, neither offers complete control. Parliamentary controls are limited by volume and political dominance, whereas judicial controls rely heavily on private initiative and financial resources.

Level 4 (8–10 marks):
- Accurate and well-developed knowledge of both parliamentary and judicial controls (AO1).
- Clear, analytical evaluation addressing both strengths and limitations of both mechanisms (AO2/AO3).
- Well-supported legal reasoning with relevant authorities/cases (e.g., Aylesbury Mushrooms, Cure & Deeley, Wednesbury) and accurate legal terminology.
- Reaches a balanced, coherent conclusion.

Level 3 (5–7 marks):
- Sound knowledge of parliamentary and/or judicial controls (AO1).
- Some attempt at evaluation/assessment, though one mechanism may be covered in greater depth than the other (AO2/AO3).
- Generally clear legal explanation with some use of appropriate terminology and examples.

Level 2 (3–4 marks):
- Basic or descriptive knowledge of controls with limited detail (e.g. mentions negative/affirmative resolution or ultra vires without detailed explanation) (AO1).
- Evaluation is superficial, assertoric, or absent (AO3).

Level 1 (1–2 marks):
- Fragmented or inaccurate knowledge of controls.
- Minimal relevant legal content.

Level 0 (0 marks):
- No creditworthy response.

Judicial review is the procedure by which the High Court (King's Bench Division) examines the legality of delegated legislation created by subordinate bodies, such as government ministers or local authorities. An individual or organisation with sufficient interest (locus standi) must apply for judicial review within strict time limits.

If the court finds that the delegated legislation goes beyond the powers conferred by Parliament in the parent/enabling Act, it declares the piece of delegated legislation 'ultra vires' (beyond powers) and therefore void and of no legal effect.

There are three main grounds of ultra vires:

1. Procedural Ultra Vires:
This occurs when the body creating the delegated legislation fails to follow mandatory procedural steps set out in the enabling Act, such as mandatory consultations or publication requirements.
- In Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd (1972), the enabling Act required the minister to consult representative organisations before creating an order. The minister failed to consult the Mushroom Growers' Association, so the regulation was held invalid as against them.

2. Substantive Ultra Vires:
This occurs when the delegated legislation exceeds the substantive scope or subject-matter powers granted in the parent Act.
- In R v Home Secretary, ex parte Fire Brigades Union (1995), the Home Secretary introduced a new criminal injuries compensation scheme that contradicted the provisions enacted in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, exceeding statutory authority.
- In Customs and Excise v Cure & Deeley Ltd (1962), a regulation allowing the Commissioners to determine tax liability without recourse to court was ruled ultra vires as the parent Act only allowed them to collect tax, not set arbitrary penalties.

3. Unreasonableness (Wednesbury Unreasonableness):
Delegated legislation can be challenged if it is so irrational or perverse that no reasonable public authority could ever have made it (Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation (1948)).
- In Strickland v Hayes Borough Council (1896), a bylaw prohibiting singing or reciting any profane or obscene song across all private and public spaces without requirement of nuisance was held unreasonable and invalid.

Level 4 (8–10 marks):
Accurate, detailed, and comprehensive explanation of judicial review and court controls over delegated legislation. Clear and accurate differentiation between procedural ultra vires, substantive ultra vires, and unreasonableness. Strong use of legal terminology and relevant illustrative case law (e.g. Aylesbury Mushrooms, Cure & Deeley, Strickland v Hayes, Wednesbury).

Level 3 (5–7 marks):
Sound explanation of the grounds of ultra vires. The explanation covers at least two grounds in reasonable depth with relevant examples/cases, though some aspects may lack detailed legal illustration.

Level 2 (3–4 marks):
Basic explanation identifying ultra vires and one or two grounds, but lacking depth, accurate legal authorities, or proper definitions.

Level 1 (1–2 marks):
Superficial or fragmentary points on court controls or rules relating to delegated legislation.

Level 0 (0 marks):
No creditable content.

The detention and treatment of suspects at a police station are regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 and PACE Code of Practice C to ensure fair treatment, prevent oppression, and protect civil liberties.

Key rights of a detained suspect include:

1. Right to Free Legal Advice (s58 PACE):
A suspect has the right to consult an independent solicitor privately and free of charge at any time, either in person or by telephone via the duty solicitor scheme. This right can only be delayed by an officer of the rank of superintendent or above for up to 36 hours in indictable offences if there are reasonable grounds to believe it will lead to interference with evidence, harm to others, or alerting other suspects (R v Samuel (1988)).

2. Right to Have Someone Informed of Arrest (s56 PACE):
A detainee has the right to have one friend, relative, or other interested party informed of their arrest and whereabouts. Delay of up to 36 hours is permitted only on strict statutory grounds authorised by a superintendent.

3. Right to Consult the Codes of Practice:
The custody officer must inform the suspect in writing of their right to inspect the PACE Codes of Practice, the custody record, and receive a written notice of rights in their language.

4. Physical Conditions and Interview Rules (Code C):
- Adequate rest: Suspects are entitled to an uninterrupted rest period of at least 8 hours in any 24-hour period, free from questioning.
- Cells must be adequately heated, lit, ventilated, and clean.
- Suspects are entitled to two light meals and one main meal in 24 hours, plus drinks upon reasonable request.
- Interview rooms must be properly lit and heated, and suspects must be offered seating.

5. Protection for Vulnerable Suspects:
Under Code C, juveniles (under 18) and mentally vulnerable persons must not be interviewed or asked to sign statements without the presence of an 'appropriate adult' (a parent, guardian, social worker, or trained volunteer).

6. Custody Limits and Reviews (ss41–44 PACE):
Detention without charge is limited to 24 hours (extendable to 36 hours by a superintendent, and up to 96 hours with magistrates' court approval). Periodic reviews of detention must be conducted by an independent review officer (at 6 hours, then every 9 hours).

Level 4 (8–10 marks):
Accurate, thorough, and detailed explanation of the rights of a suspect detained under PACE 1984 and Code C. Clear coverage of s58 (legal advice), s56 (informing someone), the role of the custody officer, physical conditions/interview rules, appropriate adults, and detention limits/reviews, supported by accurate statutory references and relevant case law (e.g. R v Samuel).

Level 3 (5–7 marks):
Sound explanation covering several key rights (such as legal advice and appropriate adults) with reasonable accuracy and reference to PACE/Code C, though some technical details or statutory sections may be omitted.

Level 2 (3–4 marks):
Basic explanation listing some rights of a detained person with limited development or minimal reference to PACE provisions.

Level 1 (1–2 marks):
Fragmentary, inaccurate, or very general remarks regarding police treatment.

Level 0 (0 marks):
No creditable content.

Candidates should critically assess how far judicial review acts as an effective control over delegated legislation.

Key areas of discussion:
1. Grounds of Judicial Review:
- Substantive ultra vires: where the minister or body makes regulations exceeding the specific powers conferred in the enabling/parent Act (e.g. R v Home Secretary, ex parte Fire Brigades Union; Attorney-General v Fulham Corporation).
- Procedural ultra vires: failure to comply with mandatory procedural requirements laid down in the parent Act, such as mandatory consultation (e.g. Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd).
- Unreasonableness / Wednesbury unreasonableness: regulations so unreasonable that no reasonable public body or minister could have made them (e.g. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation; Strickland v Hayes Borough Council).

2. Strengths / Effectiveness of Judicial Review:
- Independent scrutiny by the judiciary, free from political pressure.
- Can declare invalid (void) any secondary legislation found ultra vires.
- Provides a mechanism for individuals and groups directly affected by secondary legislation to challenge executive overreach.

3. Limitations / Ineffectiveness:
- Retrospective remedy: challenging an order or instrument can only happen after it has come into force and caused potential detriment.
- Standing (locus standi): applicants must prove a sufficient interest in the matter to bring an application.
- Cost and time: judicial review proceedings can be prohibitively expensive and slow, deterring ordinary citizens.
- Strict standard for Wednesbury unreasonableness makes successful challenges on that ground rare.
- Executive circumvention: Parliament can pass retrospective validating legislation or amend the parent Act to grant broader discretionary powers.

Conclusion:
Candidates should provide a balanced conclusion weighing whether judicial review, despite its reactive nature and procedural barriers, remains a vital constitutional safeguard alongside parliamentary controls.

Marking should be based on the Level of Response grid for Paper 1 Section B (15 marks):

Level 4 (12–15 marks):
- Excellent AO1 knowledge of judicial review grounds (procedural ultra vires, substantive ultra vires, Wednesbury unreasonableness) with accurate case citations.
- Well-developed AO2 analysis exploring both the effectiveness (independent oversight, invalidation of secondary law) and weaknesses (cost, locus standi, retrospective nature, executive response).
- Persuasive, balanced AO3 evaluation reaching a logical, well-supported conclusion.

Level 3 (8–11 marks):
- Good understanding of the judicial controls on delegated legislation with relevant examples.
- Sound analysis of some strengths and limitations of judicial review.
- Clear attempt at evaluation, though arguments may lack depth or full balance.

Level 2 (4–7 marks):
- Basic knowledge of judicial review; may describe grounds without detailed analysis.
- Limited evaluation of effectiveness with few supporting examples or cases.

Level 1 (1–3 marks):
- Fragmented or descriptive points with minimal relevance to the evaluative prompt.

Level 0 (0 marks): No creditable content.

Candidates should evaluate the role and suitability of lay magistrates (Justices of the Peace) in the modern criminal justice system.

Key areas of discussion:
1. Arguments in favour of lay magistrates:
- Cost efficiency: unpaid volunteers (save for travel/loss-of-earnings allowances), saving significant public expenditure compared to employing full-time District Judges.
- Local knowledge and connection: traditionally, magistrates live or work in the local area, offering valuable insight into local community standards and crime patterns.
- Trial by peers: reflects democratic participation and public involvement in the administration of justice.
- Panel composition: three magistrates sit as a bench, bringing multiple perspectives and avoiding individual bias or fatigue.
- Legal clerk: aided on points of law and procedure by a legally qualified legal advisor, mitigating their lack of legal qualifications.

2. Arguments against lay magistrates:
- Demographic imbalance: historically middle-aged, retired, middle-class, and not fully representative of the diverse society they judge.
- Inconsistency in decision-making: notable regional variations in sentencing and the granting of bail (the 'postcode lottery').
- Reliance on the legal advisor: risk that an untrained bench may be overly influenced by their clerk.
- Case complexity: modern criminal law and procedure can be highly intricate; lay magistrates may struggle compared to professional District Judges.
- Lower acquittal rates: statistics suggest higher conviction rates compared to Crown Court juries, raising concerns over prosecution bias ('case-hardened').

Conclusion:
Candidates should provide a reasoned judgement weighing cost and community representation against concerns of competence and consistency.

Marking should be based on the Level of Response grid for Paper 1 Section B (15 marks):

Level 4 (12–15 marks):
- Detailed AO1 knowledge of the role, background, and sitting arrangements of lay magistrates.
- Comprehensive AO2 analysis exploring both the benefits (cost effectiveness, bench of three, community participation) and drawbacks (demographic representation, inconsistencies, over-reliance on clerks, prosecution bias).
- Balanced AO3 evaluation culminating in a well-supported conclusion addressing whether lay magistrates remain justified.

Level 3 (8–11 marks):
- Sound knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of lay magistrates.
- Analysis is clear and structured, though some evaluative points may lack depth.
- Reaches a reasonable conclusion based on the discussion.

Level 2 (4–7 marks):
- Largely descriptive response outlining what magistrates do with limited critical assessment.
- General or one-sided arguments regarding their advantages/disadvantages.

Level 1 (1–3 marks):
- Minimal and fragmented knowledge shown.

Level 0 (0 marks): No creditable content.

To determine Liam's criminal liability under Section 9 of the Theft Act 1968, the following elements must be analysed:

1. Initial Entry into the Building:
- Under s9(1), Liam must enter a building or part of a building as a trespasser.
- Liam possesses a key for his employment duties. When he entered the main shop/staff room to retrieve his jacket, he had permission to access the staff room for work-related purposes. Applying R v Jones and Smith [1976], a person is a trespasser if they enter in excess of permission. While entering after hours might be questionable, his primary purpose for entering the building itself was legitimate retrieval of personal property.

2. Entry into 'Part of a Building':
- Liam then climbs through the window into the manager's office. Under s9(1)(a) and R v Walkington [1979], a separate, demarcated area (such as a restricted room or counter area) constitutes a 'part of a building'.
- Liam clearly had no permission to enter the locked manager's office by climbing through an internal window. Under R v Jones and Smith, Liam knew he was acting in excess of any general permission granted to him as an employee. Therefore, he entered this 'part of a building' as a trespasser.

3. Mens Rea and Relevant Subsection:
- Liam entered the manager's office with the specific intention to locate and steal expensive camera equipment. Under s9(1)(a), liability arises at the point of entry if the defendant enters as a trespasser with intent to steal (s9(2)).
- It does not matter that he found nothing and left empty-handed; actual theft is not required under s9(1)(a) (unlike s9(1)(b)).

Conclusion: Liam is guilty of burglary under s9(1)(a) Theft Act 1968 in relation to the manager's office.

Assessment Objectives: AO1 Knowledge and Understanding (3 marks), AO2 Analysis and Application (7 marks).

Level 4 (8–10 marks):
- Clear and accurate citation of s9(1)(a), s9(1)(b), and s9(2) Theft Act 1968.
- Accurate citation and application of R v Jones and Smith and R v Walkington.
- Comprehensive application to Liam's initial entry versus his entry into the manager's office ('part of a building').
- Correct identification that the offence is complete under s9(1)(a) upon entry with intent to steal despite nothing being taken.
- Coherent, logical conclusion reached.

Level 3 (5–7 marks):
- Good understanding of s9 Theft Act 1968 and at least one relevant case.
- Sound application to Liam entering the restricted area.
- Clear recognition of the difference between s9(1)(a) and s9(1)(b), reaching a sound conclusion.

Level 2 (3–4 marks):
- Some knowledge of burglary provisions and/or cited cases.
- Limited application to the facts of the scenario with some gaps.

Level 1 (1–2 marks):
- Minimal knowledge; superficial description without effective legal application.

Level 0 (0 marks):
- No relevant legal content.

To assess Maya's criminal liability under Section 9 Theft Act 1968:

1. Issue of Entry:
- Maya argues that she cannot be guilty because her whole body never entered the room.
- Under s9(1), there must be an entry into a building. Under R v Collins [1973], entry must be effective and substantial, but this was clarified in R v Ryan [1996], where the Court of Appeal established that partial insertion of the body (such as a head and arm) constitutes an entry in law, even if the person becomes trapped and cannot complete the intended theft.
- Maya inserted her hand and entire arm across the window frame into the interior of the gallery. Under R v Ryan, this satisfies the requirement of 'entry'.

2. Entry as a Trespasser:
- Maya has no permission, licence, or lawful right to put her arm into the private art gallery at night. She knew she was acting without permission (satisfying the mens rea requirement of trespass identified in R v Collins).

3. Relevant Subsection (s9(1)(a) vs s9(1)(b)):
- Under s9(1)(a), the offence requires entry as a trespasser with intent to commit an ulterior offence under s9(2) (here, stealing the antique vase).
- Maya had formed the intention to steal the vase before and at the time she inserted her arm into the gallery. Therefore, the offence of burglary under s9(1)(a) was completed the instant her arm entered the building with that intent.
- Although Maya failed to move or carry away the vase (meaning no completed theft occurred under s9(1)(b)), she remains fully liable under s9(1)(a).

Conclusion: Maya's defence fails; she is guilty of burglary under s9(1)(a) Theft Act 1968.

Assessment Objectives: AO1 Knowledge and Understanding (3 marks), AO2 Analysis and Application (7 marks).

Level 4 (8–10 marks):
- Clear and accurate citation of s9(1)(a) and s9(2) Theft Act 1968.
- Accurate citation and detailed application of R v Collins (mens rea of trespass / entry concept) and R v Ryan (partial entry sufficient).
- Precise application addressing Maya's specific argument regarding partial entry and failure to complete the theft.
- Correct conclusion that Maya is guilty under s9(1)(a).

Level 3 (5–7 marks):
- Sound explanation of s9(1)(a) and citation of R v Ryan.
- Good application showing that inserting an arm is sufficient for entry and that intention to steal at the point of entry suffices.
- Reaches a logical conclusion.

Level 2 (3–4 marks):
- Basic knowledge of burglary and entry.
- Limited application to the facts, perhaps confusing s9(1)(a) and s9(1)(b) or omitting R v Ryan.

Level 1 (1–2 marks):
- Minimal knowledge; unsupported assertions.

Level 0 (0 marks):
- No relevant legal content.

To determine Tariq's criminal liability under Section 9 and Section 10 of the Theft Act 1968:

1. Commission of Underlying Burglary:
- Actus reus: Tariq entered a building (a residential home) as a trespasser by forcing open a kitchen window.
- Mens rea: At the time of entry, he intended to steal jewellery (satisfying s9(1)(a)). Furthermore, once inside, he actually stole £500 in cash (satisfying s9(1)(b)).
- Therefore, Tariq has committed burglary under both s9(1)(a) and s9(1)(b) Theft Act 1968.

2. Aggravating Factor under Section 10(1):
- Under s10(1), a person is guilty of aggravated burglary if they commit any burglary and 'at the time has with him any firearm... weapon of offence, or explosive'.
- Under s10(1)(b), a 'weapon of offence' includes any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person, or intended by the person for such use.
- A flick-knife is manufactured/made for causing injury, or at minimum possessed with intent to use for injury if attacked (self-defence).

3. Application of R v Stones [1989] vs R v Kelly [1993]:
- Tariq argues that he had no intention of using the flick-knife in the course of the burglary and carried it purely for personal self-defence.
- Applying R v Stones [1989], it is settled law that if the defendant has a weapon of offence with him at the time of committing the burglary, the reason or purpose for carrying it is irrelevant; there is no requirement for the prosecution to prove that the weapon was intended to be used in connection with the burglary.
- Unlike R v Kelly (where a non-weapon tool became a weapon of offence through intent formed during the confrontation), Tariq was carrying an inherently offensive weapon / weapon intended for injury at the very time of the burglary.

Conclusion: Tariq's defence is invalid under the law; he is guilty of aggravated burglary under Section 10 Theft Act 1968.

Assessment Objectives: AO1 Knowledge and Understanding (3 marks), AO2 Analysis and Application (7 marks).

Level 4 (8–10 marks):
- Accurate statement of s9(1)(a), s9(1)(b), s10(1), and s10(1)(b) Theft Act 1968.
- Clear identification that the underlying burglary is fully made out under s9(1)(a) and s9(1)(b).
- Accurate citation and thorough application of R v Stones and distinction/comparison with R v Kelly.
- Direct refutation of Tariq's self-defence argument based on the ratio of R v Stones.
- Unequivocal conclusion that Tariq is guilty of aggravated burglary under s10.

Level 3 (5–7 marks):
- Sound knowledge of s9 and s10 Theft Act 1968.
- Correct application of R v Stones regarding possession of a weapon during burglary.
- Recognises that Tariq's excuse of self-defence does not negate liability under s10, reaching a sound conclusion.

Level 2 (3–4 marks):
- Basic explanation of burglary and s10 aggravated burglary.
- Incomplete application of the case law or failure to address the self-defence argument properly.

Level 1 (1–2 marks):
- Minimal knowledge; superficial discussion of knives or breaking into houses.

Level 0 (0 marks):
- No relevant legal content.

To establish liability for making off without payment under s.3(1) of the Theft Act 1978, the prosecution must prove the following actus reus and mens rea elements:

1. Actus Reus:
- Making off: The defendant must physically depart from the spot where payment is required or expected. In R v McDavitt (1981), making off was held to mean leaving the location where payment is expected; if the defendant is stopped before leaving the premises (e.g., inside the restaurant), the actus reus of making off is not complete.
- Without paying: The defendant must fail to pay as required or expected on the spot.
- Goods supplied or service done: There must be a valid, legally enforceable obligation to pay for the goods or services provided (Troughton v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1987)).

2. Mens Rea:
- Dishonesty: The defendant must act dishonestly.
- Knowledge: The defendant must know that payment on the spot is required or expected from them.
- Intention to permanently avoid payment: Under R v Allen (1985), the defendant must intend to permanently avoid paying the debt. A mere intention to defer or delay payment temporarily is not sufficient for conviction under section 3.

Point-based marking (maximum 5 marks). Award 1 mark for each relevant point correctly identified and explained, up to 5 marks:

- [1 mark] Identification/statutory definition under s.3(1) Theft Act 1978 (dishonestly making off without having paid for goods supplied or services done).
- [1 mark] Actus reus: 'Makes off' explained as departing/leaving the spot where payment is required/expected (credit citation of R v McDavitt).
- [1 mark] Actus reus: Without having paid as required or expected on the spot.
- [1 mark] Actus reus: In relation to goods supplied or a service provided that is legally enforceable (credit citation of Troughton v MPC).
- [1 mark] Mens rea: Dishonesty.
- [1 mark] Mens rea: Knowledge that payment on the spot is required or expected.
- [1 mark] Mens rea: Intention to permanently avoid payment of the amount due (credit citation of R v Allen / distinction from mere deferral/delay).

Candidates should provide a balanced, critically evaluative response addressing statutory definitions, key judicial precedents, ambiguities, and the overall coherence of sections 9 and 10 of the Theft Act 1968.

### 1. The Structure of Burglary (s9 Theft Act 1968)
- Section 9(1)(a): A person commits burglary if they enter any building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent to steal, inflict grievous bodily harm (GBH), or do unlawful damage.
- Section 9(1)(b): A person commits burglary if, having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser, they steal or attempt to steal anything, or inflict or attempt to inflict GBH.
- Key distinction: Timing of intent (at the point of entry for s9(1)(a) vs formation of intent and commission/attempt of the ulterior offence after entry for s9(1)(b); note that criminal damage is an ulterior offence under s9(1)(a) but not s9(1)(b)).

### 2. Analysis of the Actus Reus Elements
- Entry: Historically required to be 'substantial and effective' (R v Collins [1973]). Later relaxed in R v Brown [1985] to require only an 'effective' entry, and further modified in R v Ryan [1996], where partial entry without the physical capability to steal at that moment was held sufficient. Evaluation: Increases victim protection but blurs the boundary between an attempt and a completed entry, creating uncertainty.
- Building or Part of a Building: Broadened by statutory provisions (s9(4) extends to inhabited vehicles and vessels) and common law (Stevens v Gourley [1859]; B and S v Leathley [1979] vs Norfolk Constabulary v Seekings and Gould [1986]). Walkington [1979] established that 'part of a building' includes partitioned areas behind counters. Evaluation: Provides necessary flexibility to protect domestic and commercial premises, though distinction regarding temporary structures and containers can seem technical and arbitrary.
- As a Trespasser: Requires entry without permission, or exceeding permission given (R v Jones and Smith [1976]). Evaluation: Jones and Smith broadens liability significantly—entering with intent to steal makes one an automatic trespasser, potentially collapsing the requirement of trespass into mere mens rea of dishonesty/theft.

### 3. Analysis of Aggravated Burglary (s10 Theft Act 1968)
- Commission of burglary under s9 while having with them any firearm, imitation firearm, weapon of offence, or explosive.
- Timing of possession: For s9(1)(a), weapon must be possessed at the time of entry (R v O'Leary [1986]); for s9(1)(b), weapon must be possessed at the time the ulterior offence is committed.
- Definition of weapon of offence under s10(1)(b): Made or adapted for causing injury/incapacity, or intended for such use (R v Stones [1989], R v Kelly [1993]).
- Evaluation: Imposes severe maximum penalties (life imprisonment). While crucial for public safety and deterrence against armed intruders, cases like Kelly (using a screwdriver immediately upon being discovered) demonstrate how quickly a standard burglary can escalate to aggravated burglary based on opportunistic actions.

### 4. Critical Assessment & Conclusion
- Strengths: Modernised the archaic common law; protects domestic security; provides appropriate sentencing differentiation (14 years for dwellings, 10 years for non-dwellings, life for aggravated burglary under s10).
- Weaknesses/Criticisms: Over-extension of 'entry' and 'trespass' risks criminalising preparatory behaviour as full burglary; complexity in distinguishing between s9(1)(a) and s9(1)(b); anomalies in the treatment of criminal damage between the two subsections.
- Conclusion: The framework is broadly effective in safeguarding property and personal safety, but judicial expansion has created occasional doctrinal inconsistency and blurred the line between completed burglary and attempt.

Mark Allocation across Assessment Objectives:
- AO1 (Knowledge & Understanding): 10 marks
- AO2 (Analysis & Application): 5 marks
- AO3 (Evaluation & Coherence): 10 marks

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### Levels of Response Grid

Level 4 (19–25 marks):
- AO1 (8–10 marks): Outstanding, detailed, and accurate knowledge of s9 (both s9(1)(a) and s9(1)(b)) and s10 of the Theft Act 1968. Uses precise legal terminology and cites a wide range of relevant case authorities (e.g. Collins, Brown, Ryan, Walkington, Jones and Smith, Stones, Kelly).
- AO2 (4–5 marks): Sophisticated analysis of the statutory elements, distinguishing effectively between timing of intent, the nature of entry, trespass, and possession of weapons.
- AO3 (7–10 marks): Fully developed, balanced critical evaluation assessing whether the law operates effectively and fairly. Presents coherent arguments regarding issues such as over-criminalisation, judicial extension of 'entry', and severity of aggravated burglary penalties, leading to a reasoned conclusion.

Level 3 (13–18 marks):
- AO1 (5–7 marks): Sound and mostly accurate knowledge of burglary and aggravated burglary. Good citation of relevant statutory terms and case law, though minor details may be omitted.
- AO2 (3 marks): Clear analysis of key elements (e.g. entry, trespass, ulterior offences).
- AO3 (5–6 marks): Structured evaluation of the effectiveness and limitations of the law, with clear points raised, though some arguments may lack depth or complete balance.

Level 2 (7–12 marks):
- AO1 (3–4 marks): Basic or patchy knowledge of burglary; may focus heavily on standard theft or describe s9 without clearly distinguishing s9(1)(a) and s9(1)(b), with minimal reference to s10.
- AO2 (2 marks): Limited analysis; mainly descriptive accounts of cases with superficial application to the question.
- AO3 (2–4 marks): General or assertoric evaluation (e.g. asserting the law is tough on crime) without sufficient doctrinal critique or substantiation.

Level 1 (1–6 marks):
- AO1 (1–2 marks): Fragmentary or inaccurate knowledge of burglary provisions.
- AO2 (1 mark): Minimal attempt to analyse legal elements.
- AO3 (1 mark): Little or no evaluation; brief and disjointed statements.

Level 0 (0 marks): No creditworthy material.