2022 CCEA AS-Level Religious Studies 4610 Practice Paper with Answers

The cosmological argument is an a posteriori argument for God's existence (based on observation of the world), most famously developed by Thomas Aquinas in the 'Five Ways' (Quinque Viae) of his Summa Theologica.

The First Way, the argument from motion (or change), begins from the observed fact that things in the world are in motion or change (Aquinas uses 'motion' broadly, to mean change from potentiality to actuality). He argues that whatever is in motion must be put in motion by something else, since nothing can move itself from potentiality to actuality except by something already actual. This gives a chain of movers, each moved by a prior mover. Aquinas argues this chain cannot regress infinitely, because without a first mover there would be no subsequent movers, and so no motion at all — yet motion evidently exists. Therefore, he concludes, there must be a First Mover, itself unmoved by anything else, 'and this everyone understands to be God.'

The Second Way, the argument from causation, follows a similar structure: nothing can be the efficient cause of itself, since this would require it to exist prior to itself, which is impossible. We observe an order of efficient causes in the world; this series cannot regress infinitely, since removing the first cause removes all the causes and effects that depend on it. Therefore there must be a First (Uncaused) Cause, which Aquinas identifies with God.

A fuller account might also outline the Third Way, the argument from contingency: things in the world are contingent (they could exist or not exist, and at some time did not exist); if everything were merely contingent, at some point nothing would have existed; but if nothing had existed, nothing could begin to exist now, since something cannot come from nothing; yet things clearly do exist now; therefore a necessary being must exist, whose existence does not depend on anything else — God.

Key features: the argument rejects an infinite regress of movers/causes; it reasons from empirical premises (motion, causation, contingency exist) to a metaphysical conclusion (a First Mover/Cause/Necessary Being); Aquinas identifies this being with the God of classical theism.

Level of response marking (25 marks, AO1). Band 5 (21–25): a detailed, accurate and well-structured account of Aquinas's cosmological argument, correctly explaining the First Way (motion) and/or Second Way (causation), with accurate technical vocabulary (potentiality/actuality, efficient cause, infinite regress, contingency/necessity), showing sophisticated understanding of the argument's logical structure and conclusion; may include the Third Way for added depth. Band 4 (16–20): a mostly accurate, well-organised account covering the key stages of at least one of Aquinas's arguments in reasonable depth, with generally correct terminology; minor inaccuracies/omissions possible. Band 3 (11–15): a reasonable, generally accurate outline showing understanding of the basic structure (rejection of infinite regress, conclusion of a first cause/mover), but lacking depth or full technical precision, or only partially engaging with Aquinas specifically. Band 2 (6–10): a limited account, with some accurate but underdeveloped points; partial or confused understanding of the argument's structure. Band 1 (0–5): very limited, largely inaccurate, or irrelevant material. Answers may include: the First Way (motion), Second Way (causation), Third Way (contingency), rejection of infinite regress, potentiality/actuality, the conclusion identified with God. Accept valid alternatives. Mark in levels.

Arguments supporting the view that the cosmological argument does not prove God's existence:
• David Hume, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, questioned whether the principle that 'everything has a cause' can be applied to the universe as a whole, suggesting this may be a fallacy of composition — the fact that every part of the universe has a cause does not entail that the universe as a whole requires one.
• Hume, and later Bertrand Russell (in his 1948 BBC radio debate with Frederick Copleston), argued the universe could simply be a 'brute fact'; Russell stated, 'I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all.' This challenges Aquinas's assumption that contingent existence must have an external explanation.
• Immanuel Kant criticised the move from a contingent/dependent being to a necessary being, arguing this illegitimately imports ideas from the (separately criticised) ontological argument — the mere concept of a 'necessary being' does not guarantee one exists.
• Critics argue that, even if the argument succeeds in establishing a first cause or mover, it does not establish that this being possesses the specific attributes of the God of classical theism (omnipotence, omniscience, personal nature, benevolence) — a gap between 'a first cause' and 'the God of religious belief.'

Arguments against this view (defending the cosmological argument as evidence, if not strict proof):
• Frederick Copleston, in his debate with Russell, argued that the existence of contingent things demands an explanation, and that this explanation cannot itself be another contingent thing (otherwise the question is simply pushed back), requiring a necessary being.
• Richard Swinburne argues the cosmological argument should be understood as part of a cumulative case for God's existence, increasing the probability of theism when combined with other arguments (e.g. design, religious experience); theism, he argues, offers a simpler explanation for the universe's existence than treating it as an unexplained brute fact.
• Supporters maintain that an infinite regress remains philosophically unsatisfactory as an explanation, so Aquinas's rejection of it is a reasonable position.

A well-argued response should weigh these points and reach a justified conclusion — for example, that the argument may make theism more reasonable, or provide some evidential support, without constituting a strict deductive 'proof', since key premises (that infinite regress is impossible, that the universe as a totality needs a cause) remain contestable.

Level of response marking (25 marks, AO2). Band 5 (21–25): sophisticated, well-substantiated critical evaluation, accurately using a good range of scholarly views (e.g. Hume, Russell, Copleston, Kant, Swinburne), weighing both sides with sustained analysis, reaching a well-justified, reasoned conclusion. Band 4 (16–20): a well-informed evaluation using accurate scholarly material to consider both sides, generally well-argued, reaching a supported conclusion, though lacking full sophistication or balance. Band 3 (11–15): a reasonable evaluation showing some engagement with both sides of the debate and some accurate scholarly reference, though underdeveloped or the conclusion not fully justified. Band 2 (6–10): a limited evaluation, mostly one-sided or descriptive rather than evaluative, with limited accurate scholarly support. Band 1 (0–5): very limited or largely irrelevant material, with little evaluative content. Answers may include: Hume's critiques (fallacy of composition, brute fact), the Russell–Copleston debate, Kant's critique, Swinburne's cumulative case, the gap between 'a cause' and 'the God of theism'. Accept valid alternatives. Mark in levels.

The problem of evil challenges the coherence and credibility of theism, specifically belief in a God who is omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing) and omnibenevolent (perfectly good).

The logical (or deductive) problem of evil, associated with the philosopher J.L. Mackie ('Evil and Omnipotence', 1955), argues that the existence of evil and suffering in the world is logically inconsistent with the existence of such a God: if God is omnipotent, he would be able to prevent evil; if God is omniscient, he would know about all evil; if God is omnibenevolent, he would want to prevent evil; yet evil clearly exists; therefore, Mackie argues, at least one of these divine attributes (or God's existence itself) must be false. This apparent contradiction is sometimes called the 'inconsistent triad'.

The evidential problem of evil, associated with philosophers such as William Rowe, takes a different approach: rather than claiming a strict logical contradiction, it argues that the amount, intensity, and apparently pointless (gratuitous) nature of much suffering in the world counts as strong evidence against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God. Rowe's example of a fawn suffering and dying slowly in a forest fire, with no apparent greater good served by its suffering, illustrates suffering that seems to serve no discernible purpose — if an all-good, all-powerful God existed, it is argued, such gratuitous suffering would not occur, since God could have prevented it without losing any greater good.

A fuller account might distinguish moral evil (suffering caused by human choices/actions, e.g. war, cruelty) from natural evil (suffering caused by natural processes, e.g. disease, natural disasters), noting both forms present distinct challenges — moral evil is often addressed via appeal to free will, while natural evil is harder to explain in these terms.

Level of response marking (25 marks, AO1). Band 5 (21–25): a detailed, accurate account distinguishing the logical problem (Mackie's inconsistent triad) and the evidential problem (e.g. Rowe's gratuitous suffering) of evil, using correct technical vocabulary and possibly the moral/natural evil distinction, showing sophisticated understanding. Band 4 (16–20): a mostly accurate, well-organised account of both forms of the problem, with generally correct terminology; minor omissions possible. Band 3 (11–15): a reasonable account showing understanding of the basic challenge evil poses to the divine attributes, but with limited or unclear distinction between the logical and evidential forms, or lacking depth. Band 2 (6–10): a limited, partially accurate and underdeveloped account. Band 1 (0–5): very limited, inaccurate, or irrelevant material. Answers may include: omnipotence/omniscience/omnibenevolence, Mackie's inconsistent triad, Rowe's evidential argument/gratuitous suffering, the moral vs natural evil distinction. Accept valid alternatives. Mark in levels.

A theodicy is an attempt to defend belief in God in the face of evil and suffering, typically by explaining why an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God might permit evil to exist. Two influential Christian theodicies are relevant here.

The Augustinian theodicy (based on the theology of St Augustine) argues that evil is not a substance created by God, but a privation (absence/lack) of good; the world was created wholly good, and evil entered through the misuse of free will by angels and then humans (the Fall). Natural evil is understood as a consequence of this cosmic disorder following the Fall. God is not therefore responsible for evil, since he did not create it directly, and humans, through free will, bear responsibility for moral evil.

The Irenaean theodicy, developed in the modern era by John Hick ('Evil and the God of Love', 1966) drawing on ideas from Irenaeus, argues instead that the world was deliberately created imperfect, as a place of 'soul-making' — a challenging environment in which humans can freely develop morally and spiritually, growing towards the likeness of God by facing and responding to real evil, hardship, and suffering. On this view, a world without genuine evil or suffering could not achieve this soul-making purpose, so evil serves a greater good, ultimately justified (for Hick) in an eschatological (afterlife) fulfilment.

Assessed with reference to other aspects of human experience: candidates might draw on believers' lived testimonies of finding meaning, resilience, spiritual growth, or a deepened faith through suffering, as experiential support for the plausibility of soul-making. However, a full assessment should also engage critically: the sheer scale and apparent randomness of suffering — including suffering that appears only to destroy rather than develop character (e.g. the suffering of very young children, or suffering that leads only to despair, not growth), and the suffering of non-human animals (which cannot undergo moral 'soul-making') — is difficult to reconcile with either theodicy. Many who have directly experienced profound suffering (for example, survivors of atrocities) report that it produced only harm, not spiritual growth, challenging the theodicies' claims from a first-hand, experiential standpoint. This tension between the theoretical framework of a theodicy and the lived reality and testimony of human suffering is central to a full assessment of the quoted view.

A well-argued response should reach a justified conclusion — for example, that while theodicies offer coherent explanatory frameworks, the lived human experience of gratuitous and destructive suffering means they may fall short of providing a fully adequate explanation, or, contrastingly, that testimonies of growth through adversity lend real experiential support to the Irenaean approach.

Level of response marking (25 marks, AO2; engagement with other aspects of human experience required to access Bands 3–5). Band 5 (21–25): a sophisticated, well-substantiated evaluation using accurate scholarly material (Augustine, Hick/Irenaeus) and sustained, well-integrated reference to other aspects of human experience (e.g. testimony of suffering, resilience, community, or the destructive/non-redemptive nature of some suffering), reaching a well-justified conclusion. Band 4 (16–20): a well-informed evaluation with accurate theological content and clear reference to human experience, generally well-argued, reaching a supported conclusion. Band 3 (11–15): a reasonable evaluation, engaging with at least one theodicy and making some reference to human experience, though underdeveloped or the two strands not well integrated. Band 2 (6–10): a limited evaluation, largely descriptive, with little or no creditable reference to human experience — candidates not meaningfully engaging with human experience cannot access Band 3 or above. Band 1 (0–5): very limited or irrelevant material. Answers may include: the Augustinian theodicy (privation of good, free will, the Fall), the Irenaean/Hick soul-making theodicy, testimonies of growth through suffering or of destructive suffering, the suffering of children/animals as a challenge to theodicy. Accept valid alternatives. Mark in levels.