2026 Cambridge IAS-Level Law (9084) Practice Paper with Answers

The rule of language meaning 'to express one thing is to exclude another' is expressio unius exclusio alterius (often cited as expressio unius est exclusio alterius). Under this linguistic aid, where a statute contains a specific list of items that are not followed by general words, any item not expressly mentioned is presumed to be deliberately excluded by Parliament.

Award 1.5 marks for correctly naming the rule of language: 'Expressio unius exclusio alterius' (or 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius' / 'Expressio unius'). Allow minor spelling variations if the legal maxim is clearly identifiable. Do not credit ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis.

The regulatory body responsible for regulating barristers and specialised legal services businesses in England and Wales is the Bar Standards Board (BSB). It operates independently from the representative body, the General Council of the Bar (the Bar Council).

Award 1.5 marks for 'Bar Standards Board' (accept 'BSB'). Do not credit 'Bar Council' or 'Solicitors Regulation Authority' (SRA).

Delegated legislation can be challenged in the High Court using the judicial review procedure by an individual or group with locus standi (a sufficient interest in the matter).

The doctrine of ultra vires means 'beyond the powers'. The courts can declare delegated legislation void on the following grounds:

1. Procedural Ultra Vires: This occurs when the law-making body fails to follow mandatory procedural steps laid down in the parent (enabling) Act, such as a requirement to consult specified organisations before making the regulation (e.g. Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd).

2. Substantive Ultra Vires: This occurs when the delegate makes regulations that exceed the subject-matter powers granted in the parent Act, such as attempting to levy taxes without express statutory authority or enacting rules beyond the Act's purpose (e.g. Customs and Excise v Cure & Deeley Ltd or Attorney-General v Fulham Corporation).

3. Unreasonableness (Wednesbury Unreasonableness): A court may strike down delegated legislation if it is so irrational or unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have made it, or if it imposes arbitrary restrictions (e.g. Strickland v Hayes or Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation).

If the court finds that the legislation is ultra vires, it is declared invalid and has no legal effect.

Award 1 mark for each distinct, accurate legal point up to a maximum of 6 marks:
- Challenge brought via judicial review / locus standi requirement [1]
- Explanation of the general meaning of ultra vires (acting beyond statutory powers) / effect of being declared void [1]
- Definition/explanation of procedural ultra vires (failure to follow required statutory procedures) [1]
- Relevant case illustration/example of procedural ultra vires (e.g. Aylesbury Mushrooms) [1]
- Definition/explanation of substantive ultra vires (exceeding the scope/powers granted in the enabling Act) [1]
- Relevant case illustration/example of substantive ultra vires (e.g. Cure & Deeley / Fulham Corp) [1]
- Definition/explanation of unreasonableness / Wednesbury unreasonableness [1]
- Relevant case illustration/example of unreasonableness (e.g. Strickland v Hayes / Wednesbury) [1]

Note: Maximum 6 marks total. Accept accurate statutory/case references.

Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and Code of Practice C, the custody officer plays a central protective role:

1. Independence: The custody officer must be at least the rank of sergeant and must not be involved in the ongoing criminal investigation, ensuring objective decision-making.

2. Decision to Detain (PACE s37): The custody officer must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to charge the suspect; if not, they decide if detention without charge is necessary to secure or preserve evidence or obtain it through questioning.

3. Notification of Rights: The custody officer must inform the suspect orally and in writing of their core statutory rights under PACE Code C:
- The right to have someone informed of their arrest (s56 PACE);
- The right to consult privately with an independent solicitor free of charge (s58 PACE);
- The right to consult the PACE Codes of Practice.

4. Custody Record: The officer must open and maintain an accurate custody record, documenting all events including times of arrival, meals, medical visits, reviews, and interviews.

5. Welfare and Protection: The officer is responsible for the suspect's physical welfare (e.g., providing adequate rest, food, medical attention) and arranging an appropriate adult if the detainee is a juvenile or vulnerable adult.

6. Searches and Property (PACE s54): The custody officer authorises non-intimate searches and determines which items of property the suspect may keep or must surrender for safekeeping.

Award 1 mark for each distinct, accurate legal point up to a maximum of 6 marks:
- Custody officer must be at least the rank of sergeant and independent of the investigation [1]
- Role in deciding whether to authorise detention under s37 PACE (to secure/preserve evidence or obtain by questioning) [1]
- Requirement to inform suspect of right to free legal advice (s58 PACE) [1]
- Requirement to inform suspect of right to have someone informed of arrest (s56 PACE) [1]
- Requirement to inform suspect of right to consult PACE Codes of Practice [1]
- Opening and maintaining an accurate written custody record [1]
- Duty regarding suspect welfare / medical attention / rest / food [1]
- Requirement to arrange an appropriate adult for juveniles or vulnerable suspects [1]
- Powers and duties regarding search and retention of property under s54 PACE [1]

Note: Maximum 6 marks total. Accept correct references to PACE sections and Code C.

A comprehensive response should analyse the statutory procedures governing detention and questioning under PACE 1984 and evaluate whether they sufficiently safeguard suspect rights.

1. Role of the Custody Officer (PACE s36 & s38):
- An independent officer (at least Sergeant rank) not involved in the investigation determines whether there is sufficient evidence to charge or detain.
- Responsible for opening a custody record, logging all events, medication, meals, and visits, which ensures institutional accountability.

2. Time Limits on Detention (PACE ss41–44):
- General limit is 24 hours without charge (s41).
- Can be extended to 36 hours for an indictable offence with authorisation from a Superintendent or above (s42).
- Extensions up to 72 and 96 hours require warrants from a Magistrates' Court (ss43–44).
- Periodic reviews are mandated under s40 (first at 6 hours, then every 9 hours by an inspector).

3. Core Rights at the Police Station (PACE s56, s58 & Code C):
- Right to have someone informed of arrest (s56).
- Right to free, independent legal advice (s58).
- Right to consult PACE Code C.
- Vulnerable suspects and juveniles must have an appropriate adult present during questioning and searches.
- Interview conditions: 8 hours continuous rest in 24 hours, adequate lighting, heating, meals, and audio/visual recording under Code E/F.

4. Limitations on Individual Protections:
- Rights under s56 and s58 may be delayed up to 36 hours for indictable offences if authorized by a Superintendent on specific grounds (e.g., risk of harm, warning accomplices, or interference with evidence).
- Suspects may waive legal advice under subtle pressure or misunderstand their rights despite receiving the written notice.

5. Remedies and Enforcement (PACE ss76 & 78):
- Section 76 excludes confessions obtained through oppression or words/conduct likely to render them unreliable.
- Section 78 gives judicial discretion to exclude prosecution evidence if its admission would have an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings.

Conclusion:
PACE 1984 creates a robust framework balancing investigative efficiency against individual civil liberties, with exclusionary rules in ss76 and 78 serving as a deterrent against police impropriety.

Marking should follow the Paper 1 Section A Table A levels-based criteria (AO2: 6 marks, AO3: 4 marks).

Level 3 (7–10 marks):
- Clear and comprehensive analysis of key statutory rules and PACE Code C provisions (role of custody officer, time limits under ss41–44, rights under ss56 and 58, appropriate adult, interview conditions) [AO2].
- Well-developed evaluation discussing both the strengths of procedural safeguards and the statutory exceptions/practical limitations [AO3].
- Accurate citation of statutory sections (e.g., ss34, 36, 41, 42, 56, 58, 76, 78) and a reasoned conclusion.

Level 2 (4–6 marks):
- Descriptive knowledge and sound explanation of detention procedures and suspect rights under PACE [AO2].
- Limited or general evaluation of the balance between suspect protection and police powers [AO3].
- Some accurate references to PACE sections and Codes of Practice.

Level 1 (1–3 marks):
- Basic identification of isolated rights (e.g., right to a phone call or lawyer) with little statutory context [AO2].
- Superficial or no evaluative comment [AO3].

0 marks: No creditworthy response.

Delegated (or subordinate) legislation is law made by an individual or body under powers conferred by an Act of Parliament (an enabling or parent Act).

1. Types of Delegated Legislation:
- Orders in Council: Drafted by the government and given formal approval by the King and the Privy Council. Used in national emergencies (under the Emergency Powers Act 1920 / Civil Contingencies Act 2004), to transfer responsibilities between government departments, or to bring Acts of Parliament into force (Commencement Orders).
- Statutory Instruments (SIs): Created by government ministers and departments within their areas of responsibility (e.g., the Secretary of State for Transport making traffic regulations). These represent the most common form of delegated legislation, numbering thousands each year.
- Bylaws: Enacted by local authorities, public bodies, or statutory undertakers (such as London Underground, airport authorities, or the National Trust) to regulate behaviour and activities within a specific locality or property (e.g., parking restrictions or dog-fouling bans).

2. Parliamentary Controls:
- The Enabling/Parent Act: Parliament sets the boundaries of the delegated power, stating who can make the law, the scope of the power, and any mandatory consultation procedures.
- Affirmative Resolution Procedure: A statutory instrument must receive formal approval from Parliament (or the House of Commons) within a specified timeframe (typically 28 to 40 days) before it can become law. This is reserved for major or controversial delegated legislation.
- Negative Resolution Procedure: The statutory instrument is laid before Parliament for 40 days; it automatically becomes law unless a motion (a prayer) to annul it is passed within that period. This applies to the vast majority of SIs.
- Scrutiny Committees: The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments (JCSI) and the House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee review statutory instruments to ensure they are drafted properly, do not impose taxes without authority, do not have retrospective effect unless permitted, or do not exceed parent powers (they check technical legality, not political policy).
- Question Time and Debates: MPs can question ministers regarding proposed or existing delegated legislation.

Mark according to Table B (AO1: Knowledge and Understanding — 10 marks):

Level 4 (8–10 marks):
- Accurate and detailed explanation of all three types of delegated legislation (Orders in Council, Statutory Instruments, Bylaws) with valid examples/authorities.
- Clear and comprehensive explanation of parliamentary controls (Enabling Act, affirmative/negative resolutions, scrutiny committees/JCSI, questioning).
- Effective use of appropriate legal terminology and clear structure throughout.

Level 3 (5–7 marks):
- Sound explanation of the main types of delegated legislation and parliamentary controls, though one area may be more developed than the other.
- Relevant examples or procedures referenced.
- Mostly accurate use of legal terminology.

Level 2 (3–4 marks):
- Basic identification of types of delegated legislation and/or some parliamentary controls (e.g. mentions affirmative/negative procedures with little detail).
- Limited depth or explanations may be fragmented.

Level 1 (1–2 marks):
- Minimal knowledge; superficial points (e.g. simply naming bylaws or ministers).

Level 0 (0 marks):
- No creditable response.

The civil justice system in England and Wales operates primarily under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), introduced following Lord Woolf's reforms to simplify proceedings, promote settlement, and reduce costs and delays.

1. Pre-Trial Procedures:
- Pre-Action Protocols: Parties are required to follow specific pre-action protocols before issuing court proceedings. These encourage early exchange of information, disclosure of documents, and attempts to settle via Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (e.g., mediation). Failure to comply can result in cost sanctions.
- Starting a Claim: If settlement is not reached, the claimant files a claim form (Form N1) at court specifying the parties, the nature of the dispute, and the remedy/amount sought, along with particulars of claim. A court fee must be paid.
- Responding to a Claim: Once served, the defendant has 14 days to respond by paying the claim, admitting liability, filing a defence, or filing an acknowledgment of service (which extends time to file a defence to 28 days). If no response is made, the claimant can obtain a default judgment.
- Allocation Questionnaire / Directions Questionnaire (Form N180/N181): If the defence is disputed, both parties complete questionnaires indicating witnesses, expert evidence needed, and proposed trial timetables.

2. Track Allocation:
A procedural judge (usually a District Judge) examines the questionnaires and allocates the case to one of three tracks based on financial value, legal complexity, and importance:
- Small Claims Track: Generally for claims up to £10,000 (and personal injury claims up to £1,000, or £5,000 for road traffic accidents). Heard informally in the County Court (often in the judge's chambers/hearing room). Strict rules of evidence do not apply; legal representation costs are generally unrecoverable, encouraging self-representation.
- Fast Track: For claims with a financial value between £10,000 and £25,000 (or moderately straightforward personal injury cases). Handled in the County Court with a strict procedural timetable (usually heard within 30 to 50 weeks). Hearings are limited to one day, with restricted expert evidence.
- Multi-Track: For claims exceeding £25,000, or complex cases of lower value. Handled in either the County Court or the High Court (where claims exceed £100,000 or involve complex issues of law/public importance). Case management conferences are used by judges to tailor timetables, supervise disclosure, and manage trial length.

Mark according to Table B (AO1: Knowledge and Understanding — 10 marks):

Level 4 (8–10 marks):
- Accurate and comprehensive explanation of pre-trial procedures (pre-action protocols, claim forms/N1, defence/acknowledgment of service, directions questionnaires).
- Detailed and accurate breakdown of the three tracks (Small Claims, Fast Track, Multi-Track) including financial thresholds, court venue, and procedural characteristics.
- Consistent and accurate use of legal terms (e.g. CPR, Woolf reforms, default judgment, case management).

Level 3 (5–7 marks):
- Sound explanation of both pre-trial procedures and track allocation, though one area may be treated in more detail than the other.
- Mostly accurate financial limits and track characteristics identified.
- Competent legal terminology.

Level 2 (3–4 marks):
- Limited explanation of civil pre-trial steps or the track system.
- May confuse track limits or describe the courts in general terms without precise procedural detail.

Level 1 (1–2 marks):
- Minimal knowledge; superficial points (e.g. simply naming the County Court or small claims).

Level 0 (0 marks):
- No creditable response.

Candidates should critically evaluate the tension between certainty and flexibility within the doctrine of judicial precedent (stare decisis).

Key areas for analysis and evaluation include:

1. The Need for Legal Certainty and Consistency:
- Predictability: Binding precedent ensures that individuals and legal advisers know the law in advance and can settle disputes without litigation.
- Fairness and Equality: Like cases are treated alike, reducing judicial arbitrariness and personal bias.
- Efficiency: Lower courts follow established rules, saving court time and legal costs.

2. Mechanisms for Flexibility and Legal Development:
- The Practice Statement 1966: Enables the Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords) to depart from its previous decisions when it appears 'right to do so', ensuring the law adapts to changing social conditions (e.g. R v R (1991), Herrington v British Railways Board (1972), Hall v Simons (2000)).
- Exceptions in the Court of Appeal: Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd (1944) permits the Civil Division to depart where decisions conflict, where an earlier decision was made per incuriam, or where it conflicts with a subsequent Supreme Court ruling. Criminal Division allows broader flexibility where individual liberty is at stake (R v Gould (1968)).
- Distinguishing: Judges avoid applying binding precedent by identifying material factual differences (e.g. Balfour v Balfour vs Merritt v Merritt).
- Overruling and Reversing: Higher courts can correct outdated or erroneous decisions made by lower courts.

3. Weaknesses and Criticisms:
- Rigidity and Slowness: Bad precedents remain binding until a litigant with sufficient financial resources appeals to a court of appropriate level.
- Judicial Illogicality: Excessive distinguishing can lead to hair-splitting distinctions and undermine legal clarity.
- Retrospective Effect: Judicial law-making applies retrospectively to actions already performed, potentially creating injustice.
- Undemocratic Nature: Senior judges are unelected, raising constitutional questions regarding the separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty.

Conclusion:
Candidates should provide a balanced conclusion weighing whether the modern mechanisms of departure effectively maintain sufficient certainty while enabling necessary adaptation to contemporary values.

Assessment Objectives: AO2 Analysis & Application (8 marks) and AO3 Evaluation (7 marks).

Marking Grid (Table C standard):
- Level 3 (11–15 marks):
* AO2 (6–8 marks): Detailed, structured analysis of the mechanisms governing certainty and flexibility in precedent (e.g. hierarchy, Practice Statement 1966, Young v Bristol Aeroplane exceptions, distinguishing, overruling).
* AO3 (5–7 marks): Comprehensive evaluation offering balanced arguments comparing certainty/predictability against the rigidity of stare decisis. Uses relevant case examples accurately and delivers a coherent, well-reasoned conclusion.

- Level 2 (6–10 marks):
* AO2 (3–5 marks): Sound analysis of precedent mechanisms, though some areas may lack full development or detailed explanation of judicial tools.
* AO3 (3–4 marks): Some attempt to weigh certainty against flexibility; may present a one-sided argument or offer limited evaluation of the impact on modern law, with a basic conclusion.

- Level 1 (1–5 marks):
* AO2 (1–2 marks): Limited or primarily descriptive account of precedent without deep analytical engagement with the question.
* AO3 (1–2 marks): Bare assertions or superficial evaluative comments with little supporting authority.

- Level 0 (0 marks): No creditable response.

Candidates are required to evaluate whether alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods are always superior to court litigation for resolving civil matters.

Key areas for analysis and evaluation include:

1. Advantages of ADR over Court Proceedings:
- Cost and Speed: ADR methods (negotiation, mediation, conciliation) are generally significantly cheaper and quicker than formal court litigation in the County Court or High Court.
- Flexibility and Control: Parties retain control over the process, timing, and venue, choosing specialist third-party neutrals (especially in arbitration).
- Preservation of Commercial/Personal Relationships: Non-adversarial processes promote conciliation and ongoing cooperation (crucial in family disputes or long-term commercial contracts).
- Privacy/Confidentiality: ADR takes place behind closed doors, avoiding reputational damage and media attention, unlike open court hearings.
- Creative Solutions: Remedies can extend beyond legal damages to commercial compromises.

2. Limitations and Situations where Court Adjudication is Preferable:
- Lack of Enforceability (except Arbitration under Arbitration Act 1996): Agreements reached in negotiation or mediation may require separate contract litigation to enforce if a party defaults.
- Power Imbalance: Weaker parties (e.g. consumers or employees vs large corporations) may be pressured into accepting unfair settlements without legal protections.
- Need for Precedent and Clarification of Law: Novel points of law require authoritative judicial decisions in appellate courts (Woolf reforms recognised this public interest).
- Non-Cooperative Parties: If one party refuses to participate in good faith, ADR fails and adds an extra layer of cost and delay.
- Urgent Injunctions / Interim Relief: Courts have immediate coercive powers (freezing orders, search orders) that ADR neutrals lack.

3. Synthesis and Contextual Reality:
- Under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), pre-action protocols and cost penalties encourage ADR (e.g. Halsey / Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil CBC), meaning the modern civil justice system operates as a hybrid rather than an absolute binary.

Conclusion:
Candidates should conclude that while ADR provides undeniable benefits for many disputes, it cannot be deemed 'always' preferable, as certain legal conflicts require the authority, precedent-setting capacity, and procedural protections of formal adjudication.

Assessment Objectives: AO2 Analysis & Application (8 marks) and AO3 Evaluation (7 marks).

Marking Grid (Table C standard):
- Level 3 (11–15 marks):
* AO2 (6–8 marks): Detailed, well-structured analysis of multiple ADR mechanisms (negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration) contrasted directly with formal civil litigation.
* AO3 (5–7 marks): Insightful, balanced evaluation examining the limitations of ADR alongside its benefits (e.g. power imbalances, lack of binding precedent, enforceability issues, need for urgent remedies). Delivers a coherent, reasoned conclusion on whether ADR is 'always' preferable.

- Level 2 (6–10 marks):
* AO2 (3–5 marks): Sound analysis of ADR methods and civil court litigation, but may focus heavily on one or two methods or omit key contrasts.
* AO3 (3–4 marks): Provides some evaluation of advantages and disadvantages, though balance may be uneven and conclusion somewhat underdeveloped.

- Level 1 (1–5 marks):
* AO2 (1–2 marks): Basic, largely descriptive overview of ADR without analytical comparison to the civil courts.
* AO3 (1–2 marks): Superficial evaluation with unsubstantiated assertions.

- Level 0 (0 marks): No creditable response.

Brenda's criminal liability falls to be considered under the Fraud Act 2006, specifically Section 2 (Fraud by false representation) and Section 11 (Obtaining services dishonestly). Under s2(1) Fraud Act 2006, a person commits fraud by false representation if they dishonestly make a false representation with the intention of making a gain for themselves or causing loss to another. Under s2(2), a representation is false if it is untrue or misleading and the person knows that it is or might be untrue or misleading. Under s2(4) and s2(5), representations may be express or implied and made in any form, including electronic submissions. Here, Brenda expressly entered the code 'PRESS_VIP_ZERO' and claimed to be an accredited travel reviewer. This was factually untrue and misleading, and Brenda knew she was not accredited, satisfying s2(2). Brenda intended to make a financial gain of £600 worth of free lodging and services (s2(1)(b)(i)), and exposed Arthur to a loss of revenue (s2(1)(b)(ii)). Under s11 Fraud Act 2006, hotel accommodation and spa facilities are services made available on the basis that payment is required (s11(2)(a)). Brenda obtained these services without payment (s11(2)(b)) knowing that payment was expected and intending that no payment be made (s11(2)(c)). Applying the test for dishonesty from Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd (2017) and R v Barton and Booth (2020), Brenda knew the true facts (she was not an accredited journalist entitled to free accommodation) and ordinary decent people would consider entering a false code to deceive the booking system dishonest. Therefore, Brenda has committed offences under both s2 and s11 of the Fraud Act 2006.

Level 3 (8-10 marks): Detailed, accurate analysis of both s2 and s11 Fraud Act 2006 and the Ivey test for dishonesty; thorough application to Brenda's actions with a clear, well-reasoned conclusion. Level 2 (4-7 marks): Sound analysis of either s2 or s11, or partial analysis of both; applies facts with reasonable accuracy; reaches a logical conclusion. Level 1 (1-3 marks): Limited identification of source provisions (s2, s11, or Ivey); superficial application to the scenario; weak conclusion.

To determine whether Brody is liable for burglary under section 9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968, the relevant elements and source material must be applied:

1. Entry as a Trespasser into Part of a Building:
- Under s.9(1)(a) Theft Act 1968, a person commits burglary if they enter a building or 'part of a building' as a trespasser with the required ulterior intent.
- Applying R v Walkington (1979), a demarcated area restricted to staff (such as an area behind a counter or a closed stockroom) constitutes a 'part of a building'. Although Brody had general permission as a member of the public to be on the shop floor, entering the restricted stockroom marked 'Authorised Staff Only' exceeded any lawful licence.
- Applying R v Jones and Smith (1976), entering premises or a part thereof in excess of permission granted constitutes entry as a trespasser. Brody knew he had no authorisation to enter the private stockroom, satisfying both the actus reus of entry as a trespasser and the mens rea of knowledge/recklessness as to trespassing.

2. Ulterior Mens Rea at the Point of Entry:
- Under s.9(1)(a) and s.9(2), the defendant must possess the intention to commit an ulterior offence (stealing, inflicting grievous bodily harm, or unlawful damage) at the very moment of entry.
- Brody entered the stockroom with the specific intention to take high-value smartphones (theft under s.1 Theft Act 1968).
- The fact that the shipping crates were empty and he did not actually succeed in stealing anything does not prevent liability under s.9(1)(a), as the offence is complete upon entry with the requisite intent.

Conclusion:
Brody satisfies all elements of burglary under s.9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968.

Award marks based on the Paper 2 Section A levels-based marking grid (AO1: 2 marks, AO2: 8 marks):

AO1: Knowledge and Citation (max 2 marks):
- 2 marks: Accurate citation and clear definition of s.9(1)(a) and s.9(2) Theft Act 1968, along with accurate citation of R v Walkington and/or R v Jones and Smith.
- 1 mark: Partial or general citation of statutory rules or case authorities.

AO2: Application (max 8 marks):
- Level 3 (6–8 marks): Detailed and logically structured application of all legal elements to Brody's scenario:
- Identifies that entry onto the shop floor was lawful, but entry into the restricted stockroom constituted entry into 'part of a building' (Walkington).
- Applies Jones and Smith to demonstrate that Brody exceeded his licence and was a trespasser.
- Establishes that s.9(1)(a) only requires intent to steal at the moment of entry, so the empty crates/failure to take items is irrelevant.
- Reaches a clear, well-reasoned conclusion on liability under s.9(1)(a).
- Level 2 (3–5 marks): Some successful application of the statutory provisions and case law to Brody, but may omit discussion of Walkington or the point of completion of s.9(1)(a).
- Level 1 (1–2 marks): Basic, narrative approach with minimal legal reasoning or simple assertion of guilt without linking to the source material.

To assess Kieran's criminal liability under the source material:

1. Commission of Underlying Burglary (Theft Act 1968, s.9):
- Section 9(1)(a): Kieran entered a building (the detached house) as a trespasser (through an open window without permission) with the intention to steal property inside. Under s.9(1)(a), burglary is complete upon entry with intent.
- Section 9(1)(b): Having entered as a trespasser, Kieran also actually committed theft by appropriating the tablet computer and putting it in his backpack, satisfying s.9(1)(b).

2. Aggravating Element (Theft Act 1968, s.10(1)):
- Under s.10(1), a person is guilty of aggravated burglary if they commit any burglary and 'at the time has with him any firearm... weapon of offence...'.
- Under s.10(1)(b), a 'weapon of offence' includes any article intended by the person having it with him for causing injury to a person.
- Applying R v Stones (1989), the fact that Kieran carried the lock-knife for general self-defence does not negate liability. Carrying a weapon intended to inflict injury if attacked satisfies the requirement of having a weapon of offence with him at the time of committing the burglary.
- Under s.9(1)(a), Kieran had the weapon with him at the time of entry. Under s.9(1)(b), following R v O'Leary (1986), he also had the weapon with him at the time the actual theft of the tablet occurred.

Conclusion:
Kieran is guilty of aggravated burglary contrary to section 10(1) of the Theft Act 1968.

Award marks based on the Paper 2 Section A levels-based marking grid (AO1: 2 marks, AO2: 8 marks):

AO1: Knowledge and Citation (max 2 marks):
- 2 marks: Accurate citation of s.9(1)(a)/s.9(1)(b) and s.10(1) Theft Act 1968, including the definition of a weapon of offence, and citation of R v Stones and/or R v O'Leary.
- 1 mark: Incomplete or general citation of statutory provisions without precise subsections or case names.

AO2: Application (max 8 marks):
- Level 3 (6–8 marks): Comprehensive and robust application to Kieran:
- Establishes unlawful entry as a trespasser into a building.
- Analyzes underlying burglary under both s.9(1)(a) (entry with intent) and s.9(1)(b) (actual theft of tablet).
- Applies s.10(1) and R v Stones to show that carrying a knife for self-defence qualifies as having a weapon of offence.
- Examines the temporal requirement using R v Stones (at entry for s.9(1)(a)) and R v O'Leary (at time of theft for s.9(1)(b)).
- Concludes clearly that Kieran is guilty of aggravated burglary under s.10(1).
- Level 2 (3–5 marks): Sound application of s.9 and s.10, but lacks depth regarding the interpretation of self-defence under Stones or the exact timing under O'Leary.
- Level 1 (1–2 marks): Weak application, asserting aggravated burglary without demonstrating how the knife constitutes a weapon of offence or failing to prove underlying burglary.

Under section 22(1) of the Theft Act 1968, handling stolen goods consists of the following legal elements: 1. Actus reus — Status of the goods: The property handled must be stolen goods at the time of the handling (or represent the proceeds of stolen goods under section 24). 2. Actus reus — Conduct/Forms of handling: The defendant must either (a) receive the goods, or (b) undertake or assist in their retention, removal, disposal, or realisation, or (c) arrange to do any of the above. 3. Actus reus — Timing and benefit: The handling must occur 'otherwise than in the course of the stealing' (meaning the original thief cannot handle goods during the theft itself). Where the conduct involves assisting or undertaking retention, removal, disposal, or realisation, it must be done 'by or for the benefit of another person'. 4. Mens rea — Dishonesty: The defendant must handle the goods dishonestly (applying the objective standard). 5. Mens rea — Knowledge or belief: The defendant must know or believe the goods to be stolen at the time of handling; mere suspicion or recklessness is not sufficient (R v Hall; R v Forsyth).

Award 1 mark for each distinct, accurate legal point up to a maximum of 5 marks: - Identification of the status of the goods (must be stolen goods at the time of the act under s22/s24) [1 mark]. - Identification of the conduct/methods of handling (receiving, or undertaking/assisting in retention, removal, disposal, realisation, or arranging to do so) [1 mark]. - Reference to the requirement that it must be 'otherwise than in the course of the stealing' [1 mark]. - Reference to the requirement that undertaking, assisting, or arranging must be 'by or for the benefit of another' [1 mark]. - Identification of the mens rea requirement of dishonesty [1 mark]. - Identification of the mens rea requirement of 'knowing or believing' the goods to be stolen (and/or noting that suspicion is insufficient) [1 mark].

### Indicative Content

#### 1. Introduction and Statutory Framework (AO1)
- Theft Act 1968, s1(1): Defines theft as the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it.
- Actus reus elements:
- Appropriation (s3(1)): Assuming any of the rights of an owner.
- Property (s4): Money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and intangible property.
- Belonging to another (s5): Possession, control, or proprietary interest.
- Mens rea elements:
- Dishonesty (s2): Negative definitions in s2(1)(a)–(c) and willingness to pay (s2(2)).
- Intention to permanently deprive (s6): Treating the thing as one's own to dispose of regardless of the other's rights.

#### 2. Judicial Widening of 'Appropriation' (AO1 & AO2)
- Early conflict: R v Morris (1984) required an adverse interference with or usurpation of any single right of ownership, suggesting a non-consensual element.
- House of Lords expansion: Lawrence v MPC (1972) and R v Gomez (1993) held that an appropriation can occur even with the express consent of the owner and where consent is induced by deception.
- Extreme extension in R v Hinks (2000): An appropriation can occur upon the receipt of an absolute, valid gift under civil law.
- Analysis (AO2): By deciding that appropriation is a neutral, non-evaluative act requiring neither fraud nor absence of consent, virtually any everyday physical act involving property (e.g., accepting a gift, taking goods off a supermarket shelf) constitutes an actus reus of theft.

#### 3. Over-Reliance on 'Dishonesty' (AO1 & AO2)
- Because actus reus (appropriation) no longer filters out lawful or innocent conduct, the boundary between criminal theft and innocent daily activity rests almost entirely upon the mens rea element of dishonesty.
- Development of the test for dishonesty:
- R v Ghosh (1982): Combined objective (standards of reasonable and honest people) and subjective (defendant realised their conduct was dishonest by those standards) limbs.
- Ivey v Genting Casinos (2017) (SC) / confirmed in R v Barton and Booth (2020) (CA): Abolished the subjective second limb. The test is now purely objective based on the defendant's actual knowledge or belief as to the facts.
- Analysis (AO2): While Ivey resolves the 'Robin Hood' loophole from Ghosh, determining dishonesty still depends heavily on the subjective ethical perceptions of the jury or magistrates.

#### 4. Critical Evaluation & Discussion (AO3)
- Arguments that the law has widened too far / flaws in the current law:
- Conflict with Civil Law: Hinks creates an irreconcilable conflict between civil property law (where title legitimately passes) and criminal law (where the recipient is branded a thief).
- Fair Warning & Legal Certainty: The principle of legality (Article 7 ECHR) demands clarity. Relying on an undefined, intuitive standard of dishonesty leaves individuals unable to foresee criminal liability with certainty.
- Erosion of the Actus Reus: Criminal liability conventionally requires a culpable act paired with a culpable mind; reducing appropriation to a trivial, neutral act undermines this foundational safeguard.
- Arguments justifying the current legal framework:
- Flexibility & Protection of the Vulnerable: Narrowing appropriation would allow predators to exploit vulnerable individuals under the guise of 'valid gifts' or technically valid civil contracts without facing criminal sanction (Hinks).
- Simplification of the Law: Gomez eliminated complex technical disputes over void versus voidable title, preventing defendants from evading justice on civil law technicalities.
- Ivey Standard Consistency: The objective test applies universally across civil and criminal law, aligning legal outcomes with modern community standards of integrity.

#### 5. Conclusion (AO3)
- A reasoned concluding synthesis evaluating whether judicial interpretation has struck an appropriate balance between victim protection and legal certainty, or whether statutory codification/reform (such as Law Commission proposals) is needed to restore actus reus substance to s3.

### Mark Breakdown (Table B — 25 marks total)

#### AO1: Knowledge and Understanding (10 marks max)
- 8–10 marks: Accurate, comprehensive, and detailed knowledge of the statutory provisions (s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6 Theft Act 1968) and thorough citation of key case law (Lawrence, Morris, Gomez, Hinks, Ghosh, Ivey, Barton and Booth). Appropriate legal terminology used throughout.
- 5–7 marks: Sound knowledge of the definition of theft and key elements (appropriation, dishonesty). Relevant cases cited with minor omissions in detail.
- 3–4 marks: Basic knowledge of theft; limited citation of statutes or cases; definitions incomplete.
- 1–2 marks: Fragmentary or largely inaccurate legal knowledge.
- 0 marks: No creditworthy response.

#### AO2: Analysis and Application (6 marks max)
- 5–6 marks: Clear, analytical focus directly addressing the prompt. Explains precisely how Morris, Gomez, and Hinks stripped appropriation of wrongful conduct, and analyses the resulting burden placed on dishonesty (Ghosh vs Ivey).
- 3–4 marks: Some analysis of how cases have interpreted appropriation and dishonesty, but tends towards narrative description in parts.
- 1–2 marks: Minimal analysis; treats the prompt as a general essay on theft without exploring the shift from actus reus to mens rea.
- 0 marks: No analytical content.

#### AO3: Evaluation (9 marks max)
- 7–9 marks: Well-structured, balanced, and critical evaluation of the statement. Evaluates legal certainty, conflict with civil law, protection of vulnerable victims, and jury discretion under the Ivey test. Arrives at a clear, logically supported conclusion.
- 4–6 marks: Provides some evaluative arguments (e.g., mentions conflict with civil law or protecting victims), but arguments may be unbalanced or lack depth in concluding judgment.
- 1–3 marks: Limited evaluative comment; assertions made without supporting legal argument.
- 0 marks: No evaluative material.