Question 1 · Extract Evaluation
30 marksAssess how convincing the arguments in the three extracts are in relation to the situation in Outremer by 1187.
**Extract A**
The critical vulnerability of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the decade preceding 1187 lay not in its external borders, but in its political core. The tragic reign of Baldwin IV, the Leper King, left a destabilising vacuum of power that exacerbated factionalism. The court became split between the local barons, led by Raymond of Tripoli, and the 'court party' of aggressive newcomers like Guy of Lusignan and Gerard of Ridefort. This factional strife paralysed the kingdom's military response, culminating in the disastrous decision-making that led directly to the catastrophe at Hattin. Without this internal political rot, the Latin Kingdom could have continued to withstand its neighbours.
**Extract B**
It was the transformation of the Islamic world, rather than the internal disputes of the Franks, that sealed the fate of Outremer. Prior to the mid-1170s, the crusader states survived primarily because of Muslim disunity. However, the rise of Saladin fundamentally altered this dynamic. Through a combination of diplomatic cunning and military force, Saladin succeeded in uniting Cairo, Damascus, and Aleppo under a single ruler dedicated to the counter-crusade. This encirclement gave him access to vast resources and manpower, making the fall of Jerusalem almost inevitable. The Frankish lords, regardless of their internal cohesion, simply could not withstand this unified jihad.
**Extract C**
The fundamental weakness of Outremer by 1187 was structural: it was a colony suffering from a chronic and debilitating shortage of manpower. The Crusader states relied on a tiny ruling elite ruling over a hostile or indifferent native population. Castles could not be defended without men, and the field armies could only be assembled by stripping fortifications of their garrisons. Crucially, the Latin East was abandoned by its Western coreligionists. Despite desperate papal bulls and diplomatic missions pleading for aid, Western monarchs, entangled in their own domestic conflicts, failed to launch a major crusade to reinforce the east, leaving Outremer strategically isolated.
**Extract A**
The critical vulnerability of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the decade preceding 1187 lay not in its external borders, but in its political core. The tragic reign of Baldwin IV, the Leper King, left a destabilising vacuum of power that exacerbated factionalism. The court became split between the local barons, led by Raymond of Tripoli, and the 'court party' of aggressive newcomers like Guy of Lusignan and Gerard of Ridefort. This factional strife paralysed the kingdom's military response, culminating in the disastrous decision-making that led directly to the catastrophe at Hattin. Without this internal political rot, the Latin Kingdom could have continued to withstand its neighbours.
**Extract B**
It was the transformation of the Islamic world, rather than the internal disputes of the Franks, that sealed the fate of Outremer. Prior to the mid-1170s, the crusader states survived primarily because of Muslim disunity. However, the rise of Saladin fundamentally altered this dynamic. Through a combination of diplomatic cunning and military force, Saladin succeeded in uniting Cairo, Damascus, and Aleppo under a single ruler dedicated to the counter-crusade. This encirclement gave him access to vast resources and manpower, making the fall of Jerusalem almost inevitable. The Frankish lords, regardless of their internal cohesion, simply could not withstand this unified jihad.
**Extract C**
The fundamental weakness of Outremer by 1187 was structural: it was a colony suffering from a chronic and debilitating shortage of manpower. The Crusader states relied on a tiny ruling elite ruling over a hostile or indifferent native population. Castles could not be defended without men, and the field armies could only be assembled by stripping fortifications of their garrisons. Crucially, the Latin East was abandoned by its Western coreligionists. Despite desperate papal bulls and diplomatic missions pleading for aid, Western monarchs, entangled in their own domestic conflicts, failed to launch a major crusade to reinforce the east, leaving Outremer strategically isolated.
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Worked solution
### Extract A: Evaluation
* **Arguments:** Extract A argues that internal political decay, factionalism (exacerbated by Baldwin IV's illness), and succession crises were the primary causes of Outremer's collapse, culminating in the disastrous decisions before the Battle of Hattin.
* **Support/Corroboration:** Students can support this by referencing the bitter divisions between the 'court party' (Sibylla, Guy of Lusignan, Agnes of Courtenay, Reynald of Châtillon, Gerard of Ridefort) and the 'baronial party' (Raymond of Tripoli, the Ibelins). This factionalism led to erratic policies, such as Reynald's provocative raids on Muslim caravans, and the military paralysis during the succession crises of 1185–86. The decision to march from the springs of Saforia into the waterless desert to relieve Tiberias (advised by Guy and Gerard, against Raymond's counsel) directly caused the defeat at Hattin.
* **Challenge/Limitations:** Students can challenge this by arguing that political crises were not unique to the 1180s (e.g., the conflict between Melisende and Baldwin III in the 1150s was also severe, yet the kingdom survived). It also underplays the growing external threat and assumes that a unified Kingdom could have permanently withstood Saladin's vast resources.
### Extract B: Evaluation
* **Arguments:** Extract B argues that the rise of Saladin and his unification of Egypt, Syria, and Mosul under the banner of jihad was the decisive factor, rendering the fall of Outremer inevitable regardless of internal Frankish politics.
* **Support/Corroboration:** Students can support this by showing how Saladin successfully encircled the Crusader states by taking Damascus (1174) and Aleppo (1183), ending the traditional Frankish strategy of exploiting Muslim divisions. This unification allowed Saladin to muster an unprecedentedly large army of around 30,000 men for the 1187 campaign, vastly outnumbering the Frankish forces.
* **Challenge/Limitations:** Students can challenge this by pointing out that Saladin's empire was fragile, held together by personal loyalty, and that he faced several internal rebellions and military setbacks (e.g., his defeat by Baldwin IV at the Battle of Montgisard in 1177). Furthermore, Saladin's success at Hattin was facilitated by Frankish division, such as Raymond of Tripoli making a separate truce with Saladin in 1186.
### Extract C: Evaluation
* **Arguments:** Extract C argues that structural and demographic weaknesses, specifically a chronic lack of manpower and the failure of Western Europe to send significant military aid, left Outremer strategically isolated and unable to survive.
* **Support/Corroboration:** Students can support this by noting that the Latin settlers constituted only a small minority of the population, leaving them highly dependent on the Military Orders (Templars and Hospitallers) and mercenary forces. The catastrophic need to muster every available soldier for Hattin meant stripping the castles of their garrisons, leaving the entire kingdom undefended after the battle. Additionally, diplomatic missions to the West, such as that of Patriarch Heraclius in 1184–85, failed to secure immediate military intervention from Henry II of England or Philip II of France.
* **Challenge/Limitations:** Students can challenge this by showing that despite demographic issues, the defensive network of massive concentric castles (such as Krak des Chevaliers and Kerak) had successfully deterred Muslim forces for decades. The strategic isolation was partly self-inflicted through aggressive provocations (such as Reynald of Châtillon's Red Sea raid) which forced Saladin into open warfare.
### Conclusion
Students should offer a synthesised judgment comparing the relative merits of the three extracts. They may conclude that while Extract B correctly identifies the shifting geopolitical balance of power, it was the internal political paralysis highlighted in Extract A that turned a difficult strategic situation into a sudden and catastrophic collapse in 1187, made fatal by the structural weaknesses outlined in Extract C.
* **Arguments:** Extract A argues that internal political decay, factionalism (exacerbated by Baldwin IV's illness), and succession crises were the primary causes of Outremer's collapse, culminating in the disastrous decisions before the Battle of Hattin.
* **Support/Corroboration:** Students can support this by referencing the bitter divisions between the 'court party' (Sibylla, Guy of Lusignan, Agnes of Courtenay, Reynald of Châtillon, Gerard of Ridefort) and the 'baronial party' (Raymond of Tripoli, the Ibelins). This factionalism led to erratic policies, such as Reynald's provocative raids on Muslim caravans, and the military paralysis during the succession crises of 1185–86. The decision to march from the springs of Saforia into the waterless desert to relieve Tiberias (advised by Guy and Gerard, against Raymond's counsel) directly caused the defeat at Hattin.
* **Challenge/Limitations:** Students can challenge this by arguing that political crises were not unique to the 1180s (e.g., the conflict between Melisende and Baldwin III in the 1150s was also severe, yet the kingdom survived). It also underplays the growing external threat and assumes that a unified Kingdom could have permanently withstood Saladin's vast resources.
### Extract B: Evaluation
* **Arguments:** Extract B argues that the rise of Saladin and his unification of Egypt, Syria, and Mosul under the banner of jihad was the decisive factor, rendering the fall of Outremer inevitable regardless of internal Frankish politics.
* **Support/Corroboration:** Students can support this by showing how Saladin successfully encircled the Crusader states by taking Damascus (1174) and Aleppo (1183), ending the traditional Frankish strategy of exploiting Muslim divisions. This unification allowed Saladin to muster an unprecedentedly large army of around 30,000 men for the 1187 campaign, vastly outnumbering the Frankish forces.
* **Challenge/Limitations:** Students can challenge this by pointing out that Saladin's empire was fragile, held together by personal loyalty, and that he faced several internal rebellions and military setbacks (e.g., his defeat by Baldwin IV at the Battle of Montgisard in 1177). Furthermore, Saladin's success at Hattin was facilitated by Frankish division, such as Raymond of Tripoli making a separate truce with Saladin in 1186.
### Extract C: Evaluation
* **Arguments:** Extract C argues that structural and demographic weaknesses, specifically a chronic lack of manpower and the failure of Western Europe to send significant military aid, left Outremer strategically isolated and unable to survive.
* **Support/Corroboration:** Students can support this by noting that the Latin settlers constituted only a small minority of the population, leaving them highly dependent on the Military Orders (Templars and Hospitallers) and mercenary forces. The catastrophic need to muster every available soldier for Hattin meant stripping the castles of their garrisons, leaving the entire kingdom undefended after the battle. Additionally, diplomatic missions to the West, such as that of Patriarch Heraclius in 1184–85, failed to secure immediate military intervention from Henry II of England or Philip II of France.
* **Challenge/Limitations:** Students can challenge this by showing that despite demographic issues, the defensive network of massive concentric castles (such as Krak des Chevaliers and Kerak) had successfully deterred Muslim forces for decades. The strategic isolation was partly self-inflicted through aggressive provocations (such as Reynald of Châtillon's Red Sea raid) which forced Saladin into open warfare.
### Conclusion
Students should offer a synthesised judgment comparing the relative merits of the three extracts. They may conclude that while Extract B correctly identifies the shifting geopolitical balance of power, it was the internal political paralysis highlighted in Extract A that turned a difficult strategic situation into a sudden and catastrophic collapse in 1187, made fatal by the structural weaknesses outlined in Extract C.
Marking scheme
**Target: AO3**
Analyse and evaluate the extent to which writers' analyses, interpretations and conclusions are robust and the systematic assessments of arguments they make are defensible or not.
* **Level 5 (25–30 marks):** Answers show a very good understanding of the interpretations in all three extracts. They evaluate the arguments systematically, using highly precise and relevant historical context. There is a consistent, analytical focus and a well-substantiated comparative judgment on which extract is the most convincing.
* **Level 4 (19–24 marks):** Answers show a good understanding of all three extracts. There is appropriate historical context used to support or challenge the interpretations, though there may be some unevenness in the depth of evaluation between the extracts. A comparative judgment is attempted.
* **Level 3 (13–18 marks):** Answers show an understanding of the main arguments of the extracts. The evaluation relies more on general historical knowledge than specific contextual details. The comparison between the extracts may be limited or superficial.
* **Level 2 (7–12 marks):** Answers identify some arguments in the extracts but offer limited evaluation. Historical context is weak or contains inaccuracies. The answer may read more like a narrative of the events leading up to 1187 rather than an evaluation of the extracts.
* **Level 1 (1–6 marks):** Answers show little understanding of the extracts or the historical context. Assertions are unsupported and lack analytical focus.
* **Level 0 (0 marks):** No creditworthy response.
Analyse and evaluate the extent to which writers' analyses, interpretations and conclusions are robust and the systematic assessments of arguments they make are defensible or not.
* **Level 5 (25–30 marks):** Answers show a very good understanding of the interpretations in all three extracts. They evaluate the arguments systematically, using highly precise and relevant historical context. There is a consistent, analytical focus and a well-substantiated comparative judgment on which extract is the most convincing.
* **Level 4 (19–24 marks):** Answers show a good understanding of all three extracts. There is appropriate historical context used to support or challenge the interpretations, though there may be some unevenness in the depth of evaluation between the extracts. A comparative judgment is attempted.
* **Level 3 (13–18 marks):** Answers show an understanding of the main arguments of the extracts. The evaluation relies more on general historical knowledge than specific contextual details. The comparison between the extracts may be limited or superficial.
* **Level 2 (7–12 marks):** Answers identify some arguments in the extracts but offer limited evaluation. Historical context is weak or contains inaccuracies. The answer may read more like a narrative of the events leading up to 1187 rather than an evaluation of the extracts.
* **Level 1 (1–6 marks):** Answers show little understanding of the extracts or the historical context. Assertions are unsupported and lack analytical focus.
* **Level 0 (0 marks):** No creditworthy response.