Question 1 · Source Comparison (Part a)
15 marksRead the sources carefully and answer the following question.
**Source A**
We must remember that our primary duty is to maintain the peace of Europe. Sanctions against Italy must be measured and deliberate, designed to show disapproval without provoking a wider European conflict that would engulf us all in ruin. To cut off oil or to close the Suez Canal would not be a measure of peace; it would be an act of war. The League is a young institution, and it cannot bear the weight of a major military confrontation at this stage of its development. We must act in a spirit of conciliation, keeping open the pathways of diplomacy to resolve the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia.
*From a speech by a British politician in the House of Commons, November 1935.*
**Source B**
The half-hearted economic restrictions proposed by the League are worse than total inaction, for they offer the illusion of collective security while permitting the aggressor to complete his conquest. By refusing to impose an oil embargo or to close the Suez Canal to Italian troopships, the Great Powers have prioritised their own selfish diplomatic alignments over the covenant they swore to uphold. If the League does not act with absolute resolve to defend a weak member state today, the principles of collective security are dead, and the world will return to the law of the jungle where might makes right.
*From a speech by a representative of a smaller member state of the League of Nations, December 1935.*
**Question**
Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A and B regarding the League of Nations' policy of sanctions against Italy during the Abyssinian Crisis.
**Source A**
We must remember that our primary duty is to maintain the peace of Europe. Sanctions against Italy must be measured and deliberate, designed to show disapproval without provoking a wider European conflict that would engulf us all in ruin. To cut off oil or to close the Suez Canal would not be a measure of peace; it would be an act of war. The League is a young institution, and it cannot bear the weight of a major military confrontation at this stage of its development. We must act in a spirit of conciliation, keeping open the pathways of diplomacy to resolve the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia.
*From a speech by a British politician in the House of Commons, November 1935.*
**Source B**
The half-hearted economic restrictions proposed by the League are worse than total inaction, for they offer the illusion of collective security while permitting the aggressor to complete his conquest. By refusing to impose an oil embargo or to close the Suez Canal to Italian troopships, the Great Powers have prioritised their own selfish diplomatic alignments over the covenant they swore to uphold. If the League does not act with absolute resolve to defend a weak member state today, the principles of collective security are dead, and the world will return to the law of the jungle where might makes right.
*From a speech by a representative of a smaller member state of the League of Nations, December 1935.*
**Question**
Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A and B regarding the League of Nations' policy of sanctions against Italy during the Abyssinian Crisis.
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Worked solution
### Analysis of Similarities
- **Focus on Key Sanctions**: Both sources identify the same potential sanction options—namely, imposing an oil embargo ('to cut off oil' in Source A; 'an oil embargo' in Source B) and closing the Suez Canal ('close the Suez Canal' in both).
- **Recognition of the Policy's Scale**: Both sources acknowledge that the actual sanctions implemented or proposed by the League are limited and cautious rather than absolute ('measured and deliberate' in Source A; 'half-hearted economic restrictions' in Source B).
- **Existential Stakes**: Both sources agree that the crisis is a crucial test of the League's mechanisms, acknowledging that the outcome will shape the international order and the future viability of the League.
### Analysis of Differences
- **Efficacy and Desirability of Limited Sanctions**: Source A supports a limited, cautious approach to sanctions because it believes maintaining peace and avoiding a wider war is the primary goal. Source B, however, strongly rejects limited sanctions, calling them 'worse than total inaction' because they provide a false sense of security while letting the aggressor succeed.
- **View on Stronger Sanctions (Oil & Suez)**: Source A argues that cutting off oil or closing the canal would be an 'act of war' that the fragile League cannot withstand. Source B views the refusal to adopt these exact measures as a betrayal, driven by the 'selfish diplomatic alignments' of the Great Powers.
- **Primary Objectives**: Source A's priority is to 'maintain the peace of Europe' and pursue 'conciliation' through diplomacy. Source B's priority is the absolute enforcement of the Covenant to defend weak member states and prevent a return to 'the law of the jungle.'
### Contextual Evaluation and Explanation of Differences
- **Source A (British perspective, November 1935)**: This speech reflects the official British policy of appeasement and caution. Britain was deeply concerned about its own military readiness and feared that pushing Italy too hard would spark a Mediterranean war or push Mussolini into an alliance with Adolf Hitler (a fear that led to the secret Hoare-Laval Pact negotiations around this time). Thus, Source A rationalizes limited action as a responsible defense of European peace.
- **Source B (Smaller state perspective, December 1935)**: Smaller member states of the League of Nations lacked the military might of Great Powers and depended entirely on the system of collective security for their national survival. To them, the failure of the League to protect Abyssinia from Italian aggression signaled that the League would not protect them if they were targeted by a major power. Consequently, Source B exposes the hypocrisy of the Great Powers who prioritized national interests over League covenants.
- **Focus on Key Sanctions**: Both sources identify the same potential sanction options—namely, imposing an oil embargo ('to cut off oil' in Source A; 'an oil embargo' in Source B) and closing the Suez Canal ('close the Suez Canal' in both).
- **Recognition of the Policy's Scale**: Both sources acknowledge that the actual sanctions implemented or proposed by the League are limited and cautious rather than absolute ('measured and deliberate' in Source A; 'half-hearted economic restrictions' in Source B).
- **Existential Stakes**: Both sources agree that the crisis is a crucial test of the League's mechanisms, acknowledging that the outcome will shape the international order and the future viability of the League.
### Analysis of Differences
- **Efficacy and Desirability of Limited Sanctions**: Source A supports a limited, cautious approach to sanctions because it believes maintaining peace and avoiding a wider war is the primary goal. Source B, however, strongly rejects limited sanctions, calling them 'worse than total inaction' because they provide a false sense of security while letting the aggressor succeed.
- **View on Stronger Sanctions (Oil & Suez)**: Source A argues that cutting off oil or closing the canal would be an 'act of war' that the fragile League cannot withstand. Source B views the refusal to adopt these exact measures as a betrayal, driven by the 'selfish diplomatic alignments' of the Great Powers.
- **Primary Objectives**: Source A's priority is to 'maintain the peace of Europe' and pursue 'conciliation' through diplomacy. Source B's priority is the absolute enforcement of the Covenant to defend weak member states and prevent a return to 'the law of the jungle.'
### Contextual Evaluation and Explanation of Differences
- **Source A (British perspective, November 1935)**: This speech reflects the official British policy of appeasement and caution. Britain was deeply concerned about its own military readiness and feared that pushing Italy too hard would spark a Mediterranean war or push Mussolini into an alliance with Adolf Hitler (a fear that led to the secret Hoare-Laval Pact negotiations around this time). Thus, Source A rationalizes limited action as a responsible defense of European peace.
- **Source B (Smaller state perspective, December 1935)**: Smaller member states of the League of Nations lacked the military might of Great Powers and depended entirely on the system of collective security for their national survival. To them, the failure of the League to protect Abyssinia from Italian aggression signaled that the League would not protect them if they were targeted by a major power. Consequently, Source B exposes the hypocrisy of the Great Powers who prioritized national interests over League covenants.
Marking scheme
**Level 4 (12–15 marks)**: Identifies similarities and differences, and evaluates the sources using contextual knowledge and/or provenance to explain the differences in perspective.
- Evaluates how the national interests of a Great Power (Britain, fearing war with Italy and seeking to maintain the European balance of power) contrast with the survival anxieties of a smaller nation (relying strictly on the covenant of collective security).
**Level 3 (8–11 marks)**: Identifies both similarities and differences between the two sources.
- *Similarities*: Both discuss the same specific measures (oil embargo, Suez Canal) and agree that the current sanctions are limited/moderate.
- *Differences*: Source A supports moderate sanctions to prevent war; Source B criticizes them as weak and a betrayal of the Covenant.
**Level 2 (4–7 marks)**: Identifies either similarities OR differences. (Max 6 marks if only one side is done, or if points are listed without structured comparison).
**Level 1 (1–3 marks)**: Explains or describes the sources but offers no valid comparative points.
- Evaluates how the national interests of a Great Power (Britain, fearing war with Italy and seeking to maintain the European balance of power) contrast with the survival anxieties of a smaller nation (relying strictly on the covenant of collective security).
**Level 3 (8–11 marks)**: Identifies both similarities and differences between the two sources.
- *Similarities*: Both discuss the same specific measures (oil embargo, Suez Canal) and agree that the current sanctions are limited/moderate.
- *Differences*: Source A supports moderate sanctions to prevent war; Source B criticizes them as weak and a betrayal of the Covenant.
**Level 2 (4–7 marks)**: Identifies either similarities OR differences. (Max 6 marks if only one side is done, or if points are listed without structured comparison).
**Level 1 (1–3 marks)**: Explains or describes the sources but offers no valid comparative points.