Question 1 · Comparative Source Analysis (Part a)
15 marksRead the sources and then answer the question below.
**Source A**: From a speech by Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Secretary, to the British Parliament, October 1935.
"We have always been loyal to the League of Nations. In this difficult crisis, we must act in unison with other member states. Unilateral action by Great Britain would not serve the cause of peace; it would lead directly to a European war. Collective security does not mean that one nation must bear the entire burden of enforcement. We are working tirelessly to find a peaceful, negotiated settlement that is acceptable to both Italy and Abyssinia, whilst maintaining the principles of the League Covenant. Economic sanctions must be applied cautiously so as not to provoke a wider, more devastating conflagration."
**Source B**: From a speech by Emperor Haile Selassie of Abyssinia to the League of Nations Assembly, June 1936.
"I must ask the great powers: what real assistance has been given to Abyssinia? From the very beginning of this crisis, the League has hesitated and delayed. While my people were being systematically destroyed by poison gas and superior weaponry, the League engaged in endless debates and half-hearted economic sanctions that avoided the one thing that could stop the aggressor—an oil embargo. The secret agreements made behind our backs showed that the powerful member states cared more for pacifying the aggressor than upholding collective security. It is not just Abyssinia that is at stake today; it is the very existence of the League itself."
**Question**: Compare and contrast the views expressed in Source A and Source B regarding the League of Nations' response to the Abyssinian Crisis.
**Source A**: From a speech by Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Secretary, to the British Parliament, October 1935.
"We have always been loyal to the League of Nations. In this difficult crisis, we must act in unison with other member states. Unilateral action by Great Britain would not serve the cause of peace; it would lead directly to a European war. Collective security does not mean that one nation must bear the entire burden of enforcement. We are working tirelessly to find a peaceful, negotiated settlement that is acceptable to both Italy and Abyssinia, whilst maintaining the principles of the League Covenant. Economic sanctions must be applied cautiously so as not to provoke a wider, more devastating conflagration."
**Source B**: From a speech by Emperor Haile Selassie of Abyssinia to the League of Nations Assembly, June 1936.
"I must ask the great powers: what real assistance has been given to Abyssinia? From the very beginning of this crisis, the League has hesitated and delayed. While my people were being systematically destroyed by poison gas and superior weaponry, the League engaged in endless debates and half-hearted economic sanctions that avoided the one thing that could stop the aggressor—an oil embargo. The secret agreements made behind our backs showed that the powerful member states cared more for pacifying the aggressor than upholding collective security. It is not just Abyssinia that is at stake today; it is the very existence of the League itself."
**Question**: Compare and contrast the views expressed in Source A and Source B regarding the League of Nations' response to the Abyssinian Crisis.
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Worked solution
### Comparison (Points of Agreement)
- **The Role of the League:** Both sources accept that the Abyssinian Crisis is an issue for the League of Nations to resolve under its Covenant.
- **Sanctions:** Both sources agree that economic sanctions are the primary policy being utilized to deter Italian aggression.
- **The Principle of Collective Security:** Both recognize that the response depends on the collective action of member states, rather than any single nation acting alone.
### Contrast (Points of Difference)
- **Evaluation of the Sanctions:** Source A supports a "cautious" application of economic sanctions to prevent a broader war. Source B labels these sanctions "half-hearted" and criticizes the failure to implement an oil embargo.
- **Diplomatic Integrity:** Source A describes British diplomatic efforts as an attempt to find a "peaceful, negotiated settlement" acceptable to all. Source B exposes these negotiations as "secret agreements made behind our backs," implying treachery and appeasement.
- **Urgency vs. Caution:** Source A prioritizes preventing a "wider, more devastating conflagration" (a European war). Source B prioritizes immediate, robust action to save Abyssinia from destruction, criticizing the League's "hesitation and delay."
### Evaluation (Context and Provenance)
- **Source A (Sir Samuel Hoare, October 1935):** Written at the start of the crisis. Hoare's speech is designed to appease domestic public opinion in Britain, which strongly supported the League (as shown by the 1935 Peace Ballot), while simultaneously avoiding any bold actions (like military intervention or oil sanctions) that could provoke Italy into war. His perspective is guided by British national self-interest and European balance-of-power diplomacy.
- **Source B (Haile Selassie, June 1936):** Written after the fall of Addis Ababa. Selassie's perspective is that of a defeated victim of aggression. He has no diplomatic need to protect British or French interests, allowing him to speak with brutal honesty. His speech serves as a prophetic warning that the failure of collective security in Abyssinia would lead to the collapse of the international order.
- **The Role of the League:** Both sources accept that the Abyssinian Crisis is an issue for the League of Nations to resolve under its Covenant.
- **Sanctions:** Both sources agree that economic sanctions are the primary policy being utilized to deter Italian aggression.
- **The Principle of Collective Security:** Both recognize that the response depends on the collective action of member states, rather than any single nation acting alone.
### Contrast (Points of Difference)
- **Evaluation of the Sanctions:** Source A supports a "cautious" application of economic sanctions to prevent a broader war. Source B labels these sanctions "half-hearted" and criticizes the failure to implement an oil embargo.
- **Diplomatic Integrity:** Source A describes British diplomatic efforts as an attempt to find a "peaceful, negotiated settlement" acceptable to all. Source B exposes these negotiations as "secret agreements made behind our backs," implying treachery and appeasement.
- **Urgency vs. Caution:** Source A prioritizes preventing a "wider, more devastating conflagration" (a European war). Source B prioritizes immediate, robust action to save Abyssinia from destruction, criticizing the League's "hesitation and delay."
### Evaluation (Context and Provenance)
- **Source A (Sir Samuel Hoare, October 1935):** Written at the start of the crisis. Hoare's speech is designed to appease domestic public opinion in Britain, which strongly supported the League (as shown by the 1935 Peace Ballot), while simultaneously avoiding any bold actions (like military intervention or oil sanctions) that could provoke Italy into war. His perspective is guided by British national self-interest and European balance-of-power diplomacy.
- **Source B (Haile Selassie, June 1936):** Written after the fall of Addis Ababa. Selassie's perspective is that of a defeated victim of aggression. He has no diplomatic need to protect British or French interests, allowing him to speak with brutal honesty. His speech serves as a prophetic warning that the failure of collective security in Abyssinia would lead to the collapse of the international order.
Marking scheme
### Marking Scheme
* **Level 1 (1–3 marks):** Identifies basic surface-level similarities or differences, or simply summarizes the contents of both sources without direct comparison.
* **Level 2 (4–7 marks):** Identifies valid similarities OR differences with appropriate source support, but does not cover both.
* **Level 3 (8–10 marks):** Identifies both valid similarities AND differences with support from both sources. At this level, analysis remains largely focused on the text.
* **Level 4 (11–15 marks):** Evaluates the sources using historical context, provenance, and audience to explain *why* the views differ. Explains how the different political positions and dates (October 1935 vs. June 1936) shape the arguments of Samuel Hoare and Haile Selassie.
* **Level 1 (1–3 marks):** Identifies basic surface-level similarities or differences, or simply summarizes the contents of both sources without direct comparison.
* **Level 2 (4–7 marks):** Identifies valid similarities OR differences with appropriate source support, but does not cover both.
* **Level 3 (8–10 marks):** Identifies both valid similarities AND differences with support from both sources. At this level, analysis remains largely focused on the text.
* **Level 4 (11–15 marks):** Evaluates the sources using historical context, provenance, and audience to explain *why* the views differ. Explains how the different political positions and dates (October 1935 vs. June 1936) shape the arguments of Samuel Hoare and Haile Selassie.