2025 CCEA AS-Level History 4010 Practice Paper with Answers

Parliament's victory in the Civil War by 1646 resulted from a combination of military reorganisation, external alliance, and underlying resource advantage. Militarily, the creation of the New Model Army in early 1645 was decisive: this was a professional, centrally funded and disciplined force under the overall command of Sir Thomas Fairfax, with Oliver Cromwell as his cavalry commander, replacing the previous patchwork of regional and often poorly coordinated Parliamentarian armies. The New Model Army's quality was demonstrated conclusively at the Battle of Naseby in June 1645, where it decisively defeated the main Royalist field army, destroying Charles I's ability to raise another force of comparable strength and effectively determining the war's outcome.
This military reorganisation was itself enabled by the Self-Denying Ordinance of April 1645, through which Parliament required most of its members (with an important exception made for Cromwell) to resign their military commands, removing a number of commanders whose position rested on political influence or social status rather than proven military competence, and allowing command to be reorganised around demonstrated ability, most obviously in Fairfax and Cromwell's leadership of the newly unified army.
Externally, the Solemn League and Covenant, agreed with the Scots in September 1643, secured vital Scottish military support for Parliament in exchange for a promise to establish Presbyterianism in England, bringing a substantial Scottish army into the war on Parliament's side from early 1644 and contributing significantly to Parliamentarian victory at Marston Moor in July 1644, which had already broken Royalist strength in the north before Naseby delivered the decisive blow in the south.
Finally, underlying all of this was Parliament's considerable resource advantage: it controlled London, by far the wealthiest and most populous city in England and the centre of English trade and finance, along with most of the navy and the more prosperous, densely populated south-east of the country, giving Parliament a far larger and more reliable base of taxation, supply and manpower than the Royalists, who depended more heavily on the poorer north and west.
Final answer: Parliament won the Civil War by 1646 because of the professional, disciplined New Model Army created in 1645 (decisive at Naseby), the Self-Denying Ordinance's removal of weak, politically-appointed commanders in favour of proven leaders such as Fairfax and Cromwell, the vital military alliance with the Scots secured by the Solemn League and Covenant, and Parliament's underlying advantage in controlling London, the navy and the wealthier south-east of England.

4-level mark scheme (10 marks). Level 1 (1–2): a simple, undeveloped answer naming one factor with minimal explanation. Level 2 (3–5): identifies and explains a limited range of relevant factors (e.g. the New Model Army or Naseby alone) with some accuracy but limited analytical depth. Level 3 (6–8): a well-organised, analytical answer covering a good range of relevant factors with accurate supporting detail (e.g. the Self-Denying Ordinance, the Solemn League and Covenant, resource control), showing clear understanding of causation. Level 4 (9–10): a sophisticated, fully substantiated analysis covering multiple factors in depth, showing perceptive understanding of how the factors interrelate (e.g. how the Self-Denying Ordinance made the New Model Army's effective leadership possible), with precise supporting detail and confident QWC. Non-prescriptive; credit valid alternative factors and evidence for Option (a) (e.g. the Crown's dependency on an unreformed and inadequate revenue system, the failure of the Great Contract of 1610, impositions and the Cockayne Project, extravagance and the cost of maintaining favourites) marked to the same level descriptors.

Source 1 has clear and specific utility for a historian studying opposition to Charles I's Personal Rule. Its principal value lies in what it reveals about the nature, rather than simply the existence, of gentry unease about Ship Money: the writer is careful to state that his objection is not to taxation itself, or even to the goal of funding the navy, but specifically to the constitutional method — money 'asked of us without any Parliament sitting to grant it' — which corroborates what historians know from other evidence, namely that the most serious and articulate criticism of Ship Money centred on the precedent it appeared to set for permanently bypassing Parliament's role in taxation, rather than on simple resentment at having to pay. The source is also useful as direct evidence of the practical, deterrent effect of John Hampden's well-known refusal to pay Ship Money and his subsequent prosecution: the writer explicitly states he collects the levy partly 'because Mr Hampden's own refusal has already shown what becomes of a gentleman who does not', showing how the case functioned to discourage open resistance among compliant, cautious gentry even where genuine reservations existed.
However, the source's utility is limited in several ways requiring contextual knowledge to assess. As a private letter from a single Buckinghamshire Justice of the Peace, it reflects the views of one local official who ultimately complied with the levy, and cannot straightforwardly be generalised to represent the views of gentry more broadly, still less those (like Hampden himself) prepared to refuse payment outright and risk prosecution; its value is therefore as evidence of moderate, compliant unease rather than of active resistance. The letter is also dated September 1636, meaning it captures opposition to Ship Money specifically, at a relatively early stage of dissent, and says nothing about how opposition to the Personal Rule would later intensify and connect with other grievances, particularly the religious unrest provoked by Archbishop Laud's reforms and, decisively, the Scottish crisis following the attempted imposition of a new Prayer Book in 1637, which required Charles to recall Parliament in 1640 and thereby ended the Personal Rule altogether. Contextual knowledge of this wider, escalating crisis is needed to place this source's specifically financial and Ship-Money-focused unease within the fuller pattern of opposition that eventually brought down Personal Rule.
Final answer: Source 1 is genuinely useful as first-hand evidence of the specifically constitutional (rather than merely financial) character of gentry unease about Ship Money, and of the deterrent effect of Hampden's case, but its narrow, single-county and compliant perspective, and its early date within the decade, mean contextual knowledge of the wider religious and Scottish dimensions of opposition to Personal Rule is needed to use it as evidence of opposition to the Personal Rule as a whole.

4-level mark scheme (20 marks) assessing utility, content, provenance (author, date, mode, motive, audience, tone) and integration of contextual knowledge. Level 1 (1–5): simple comprehension of the source's content with little/no comment on utility or provenance. Level 2 (6–10): some valid comment on content and/or provenance (e.g. noting the author is a compliant JP) with limited use of contextual knowledge; utility discussed in a basic, one-sided way. Level 3 (11–15): a balanced discussion of both the source's strengths and limitations as evidence, with sound use of provenance (private letter, local official, 1636 date) and relevant contextual knowledge (e.g. Hampden's case) deployed to assess reliability/typicality. Level 4 (16–20): a sophisticated, well-substantiated evaluation integrating content, provenance and precise contextual knowledge (e.g. the constitutional basis of Ship Money objections, Hampden's prosecution, the later Scottish Prayer Book crisis of 1637 and its role in ending Personal Rule) to reach a clear, justified overall judgement on utility for the specific historical enquiry. Max 20 marks.

Interpretation A presents a long-term, structural explanation, arguing that decades of accumulating religious and constitutional tension, crystallised by Archbishop Laud's religious reforms of the 1630s and then decisively sharpened by the Scottish rebellion of 1637–40 against the same religious policies, created a crisis of such underlying scale that war became effectively unavoidable. This interpretation draws on genuine and significant evidence: Laud's ceremonial reforms, including the repositioning of communion tables as altars and an emphasis on ritual that many English Protestants associated with Catholicism, did generate real and widespread anxiety about the direction of the Church of England, and the Scottish rebellion against the imposition of a similar Prayer Book in 1637 is rightly identified by most historians as the immediate trigger that forced Charles to recall Parliament in 1640 after eleven years of Personal Rule, ending his ability to govern indefinitely without it.
Interpretation B, by contrast, offers a short-term, contingent political explanation, arguing that long-term tensions explain only why civil war was possible in principle, not why it actually broke out in 1642 rather than being managed, as comparable tensions between Crown and Parliament had been absorbed or resolved in earlier reigns (including, implicitly, earlier moments in James I's and Charles I's own reigns). This interpretation also draws on strong evidence: the Grand Remonstrance of November 1641, a lengthy parliamentary indictment of Charles's entire reign, passed by a majority of only eleven votes, genuinely divided Parliament itself and pushed a number of previously moderate members towards the King's side, believing Parliament's leadership under figures such as Pym had gone beyond legitimate grievance into something more threatening; and Charles's attempted arrest of five members of the Commons in person in January 1642, an extraordinary and unprecedented breach of parliamentary privilege that failed when the five members had already fled, is widely regarded by historians as the single act that most decisively destroyed remaining trust between King and Parliament, after which both sides began openly preparing for the possibility of war.
On balance, Interpretation B provides the more convincing explanation of the war's actual outbreak specifically in 1642, though the two interpretations are best understood as operating at different, complementary levels of causation rather than being straightforwardly opposed. Interpretation A convincingly explains why England possessed, by 1640, the accumulated religious and constitutional tensions capable of producing a war of this scale and intensity once a sufficiently severe crisis occurred — without decades of unresolved anxiety about royal religious policy and the scope of prerogative power, even a crisis as severe as the attempted arrest of the Five Members might plausibly have been contained or resolved through negotiation, as earlier confrontations had been. But Interpretation B better explains why war broke out specifically when it did, in 1642, rather than at any of the several earlier points (the Petition of Right in 1628, the Short Parliament of 1640) at which comparable long-term tensions had already been visible without producing war: it took the specific, avoidable political missteps of 1641–42, especially the divisive Grand Remonstrance and Charles's catastrophic attempt to arrest the Five Members, to convert long-standing structural tension into an actual, irreversible breakdown of trust.
Final answer: Interpretation B, emphasising the specific political missteps of 1641–42 (the divisive Grand Remonstrance and Charles's attempted arrest of the Five Members) as the decisive trigger, is the more convincing explanation of why civil war broke out specifically in 1642, while Interpretation A's emphasis on long-term religious and constitutional tension better explains why England possessed, by that point, the underlying conditions capable of producing a war of such scale and intensity — the two interpretations describe precondition and trigger respectively, rather than being genuinely contradictory.

4-level mark scheme (30 marks) assessing critical analysis of both interpretations, deployment of precise contextual knowledge, evaluation of the arguments' relative strength, and a substantiated overall judgement. Level 1 (1–7): simple comprehension/summary of the interpretations with little critical analysis or contextual knowledge. Level 2 (8–15): both interpretations are described with some critical comment and limited relevant contextual knowledge (e.g. general awareness of Laud and the Grand Remonstrance, without specific supporting detail). Level 3 (16–23): a balanced, analytical comparison of both interpretations, supported by accurate, specific contextual knowledge (e.g. the Scottish Prayer Book crisis of 1637, the narrow Grand Remonstrance majority, the Five Members incident), with a reasoned preference emerging. Level 4 (24–30): a sophisticated, fully substantiated evaluation of both interpretations using precise contextual knowledge, reaching a clear, well-justified overall judgement that explains not just which interpretation is preferred but why, potentially showing how the interpretations relate to different levels of causation (precondition versus trigger) rather than being simply right or wrong. Max 30 marks.

The Nine Years' War broke out in 1688 for a combination of long-building French provocation and a decisive change in the European balance of power. Through the mid-1680s, Louis XIV pursued an aggressive 'Reunions' policy, using specially convened French courts to claim, on often tenuous legal grounds, additional territories along France's eastern border deemed to have historically belonged to previously annexed lands, most notably the seizure of the free city of Strasbourg in 1681. This steady, legally dressed-up expansion, backed by the implicit threat of French military force, alarmed France's neighbours considerably and convinced several states that only a coordinated response could check further French encroachment, leading Austria, Spain, Sweden, and a number of German states to form the defensive League of Augsburg in 1686.
Tensions escalated further when Louis advanced a claim to the Palatinate on behalf of his sister-in-law, Elizabeth Charlotte, following the death of her brother, the Elector Palatine, in 1685, despite the weakness of her inheritance claim under German law. When this claim was resisted, French forces invaded and, from late 1688, deliberately devastated the Palatinate, a scorched-earth policy intended to prevent the region being used as a base against France but which caused widespread destruction and confirmed for many observers across Europe that Louis's ambitions posed a serious ongoing threat requiring a full military response rather than further diplomatic accommodation.
The final, decisive element was William of Orange's invasion of England in November 1688, the 'Glorious Revolution', which deposed James II and brought William, already the leader of Dutch resistance to French expansion, to the English throne. This transformed what might otherwise have remained a more limited German and Dutch conflict with France into a genuinely wide European war, since it aligned England's substantial naval and financial resources firmly with the anti-French coalition already forming around the League of Augsburg, from which the war took its name (also known as the War of the League of Augsburg).
Final answer: the Nine Years' War broke out in 1688 because of Louis XIV's aggressive Reunions policy and the resulting formation of the defensive League of Augsburg in 1686, his provocative and legally weak claim to the Palatinate followed by its devastation from late 1688, and William of Orange's invasion of England, which brought English resources decisively into the anti-French coalition.

4-level mark scheme (8 marks). Level 1 (1–2): a basic, undeveloped answer naming one factor with minimal explanation. Level 2 (3–4): identifies and explains a limited range of relevant factors (e.g. the Reunions policy alone) with some accuracy. Level 3 (5–6): explains a good range of relevant factors (Reunions, the League of Augsburg, the Palatinate claim, William's invasion of England) with accurate supporting detail. Level 4 (7–8): a well-substantiated, precise explanation of multiple interlinked factors, showing clear understanding of how French expansion under Louis progressively provoked a coordinated, and eventually England-inclusive, European response. Max 8 marks; credit valid alternative supporting detail.

There is a substantial, though not unqualified, case for agreeing with this statement when the period 1660–97 is considered as a whole. In its earlier phase, Louis XIV's foreign policy achieved genuine and significant gains for France. The War of Devolution (1667–68), fought to press a disputed inheritance claim on behalf of his wife, secured a number of towns in the Spanish Netherlands, while the more substantial Dutch War (1672–78) ultimately gained France the Franche-Comté and further towns in Flanders, confirmed at the Peace of Nijmegen (1678–79) on terms generally favourable to France, at a moment when Louis's prestige and France's relative power in Europe were arguably at their peak. The subsequent Reunions policy of the 1680s, though provocative, extended this run of gains further still, most notably securing the strategically valuable city of Strasbourg in 1681, all achieved without provoking a fully united European military response at that stage.
However, this pattern of largely successful, incremental expansion provoked increasingly severe long-term costs that, by 1697, arguably outweighed the earlier gains. Louis's continued aggression, particularly the Reunions policy and the provocative and legally dubious claim to the Palatinate, convinced an increasing number of European states that unilateral, ad hoc responses to French expansion were no longer sufficient, leading to the formation of the League of Augsburg in 1686 and, decisively, its transformation into a full anti-French coalition including England after 1688. The resulting Nine Years' War (1688–97) proved enormously costly for France in both financial and human terms, straining French finances severely at a time when Louis's extravagant court at Versailles and continuous warfare were already placing heavy demands on the French treasury, and the war ultimately ended in the Peace of Ryswick (1697) on terms that required Louis to make significant concessions, including formally recognising William III as the legitimate King of England (a considerable blow to Louis's earlier support for the exiled James II) and returning several of the Reunion territories gained in the 1680s, including most notably Lorraine, though France did retain Strasbourg.
On balance, the statement should be substantially agreed with when the full 1660–97 period is assessed, since the cumulative long-term effect of Louis's aggressive policy was to convert what had initially been fragmented, manageable opposition into an increasingly large, determined and eventually successful coalition capable of imposing real costs and concessions on France by 1697, a considerably less favourable strategic position than France's relative isolation of its opponents had allowed in the 1660s and 1670s. This should not, however, be overstated: France emerged from the Nine Years' War bruised and financially strained but not fundamentally broken as a Great Power, retaining Strasbourg and a leading position in Europe, and the truly decisive test of whether Louis's policies had structurally weakened France's position would come only in the subsequent, even more costly War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14).
Final answer: the statement should be substantially agreed with — while Louis XIV's foreign policy achieved genuine territorial and prestige gains up to the late 1670s and early 1680s, its cumulative long-term effect, provoking an increasingly large and determined anti-French coalition and culminating in the costly concessions of the 1697 Peace of Ryswick, did more to weaken France's strategic position and finances by the end of the period than the earlier gains had done to strengthen it, though France remained a leading European power rather than being fundamentally broken by 1697.

4-level mark scheme (22 marks). Level 1 (1–5): a basic, largely narrative or one-sided answer with little explicit evaluation of the proposition. Level 2 (6–11): some relevant factors relating to both French gains and long-term costs discussed with limited comparison or evaluation of their relative significance; a stated but underdeveloped judgement. Level 3 (12–17): a balanced, analytical discussion weighing early gains (War of Devolution, Dutch War, Nijmegen, the Reunions) against the costs of the Nine Years' War and Ryswick, supported by accurate evidence, with a reasoned judgement. Level 4 (18–22): a sophisticated, fully substantiated evaluation weighing both sides of the proposition with precise supporting evidence (e.g. specific territorial gains and losses, the formation of the League of Augsburg, the Ryswick recognition of William III), reaching a clear, well-justified overall judgement about the balance of strengthening versus weakening across the full period. Max 22 marks.

The War of the Spanish Succession broke out in 1701–02 because of a succession crisis in Spain that Louis XIV's subsequent conduct converted into a genuine and, for the other major powers, unacceptable threat to the European balance of power. The immediate trigger was the death of the childless Habsburg King Charles II of Spain in November 1700; his will, signed shortly before his death, named Philip of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV, as his sole heir to the entire Spanish Empire, rather than dividing the inheritance or favouring the rival Austrian Habsburg claimant, the Archduke Charles, as earlier partition treaties negotiated among the powers had anticipated.
Louis XIV's decision to accept the will in full on his grandson's behalf, rather than honouring the earlier partition arrangements, immediately raised the alarming prospect, for France's rivals, of an eventual union of the French and Spanish crowns and their combined empires under Bourbon control, which would have decisively upset the existing European balance of power. Louis compounded this alarm through a series of further provocative actions in 1701: he explicitly maintained Philip's rights of succession to the French throne itself, undermining assurances that the two crowns would remain permanently separate, and ordered French troops to occupy the so-called Dutch Barrier fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, garrisons the Dutch Republic had relied upon since Ryswick as a defensive buffer against French invasion, directly threatening Dutch security.
A further, deeply antagonising act came in September 1701, when, upon the death in exile of the former King James II, Louis recognised James's son, James Francis Edward Stuart, as the legitimate King of England, in direct violation of the terms of the Treaty of Ryswick, in which Louis had formally recognised William III as king. This was interpreted in England, correctly, as a serious provocation and a threat to the Protestant succession itself, decisively hardening English opinion, including that of a reluctant Parliament, in favour of renewed war against France. In response to this combination of threats, England, the Dutch Republic and Austria formed the Grand Alliance in September 1701, explicitly aimed at preventing the union of the French and Spanish crowns and securing an acceptable partition of the Spanish inheritance, and war formally began in 1702 following the deaths of William III (who had driven the Alliance's formation) and the accession of Queen Anne.
Final answer: the War of the Spanish Succession broke out because Charles II's will left the entire Spanish inheritance to Louis XIV's grandson Philip of Anjou, Louis's acceptance of this in full alongside provocative actions (maintaining Philip's French succession rights, occupying the Dutch Barrier fortresses, and recognising the exiled Stuart claimant as King of England), which together convinced England, the Dutch Republic and Austria to form the Grand Alliance in 1701 to prevent Bourbon domination of Europe.

4-level mark scheme (8 marks). Level 1 (1–2): a basic, undeveloped answer naming one factor with minimal explanation. Level 2 (3–4): identifies and explains a limited range of relevant factors (e.g. Charles II's will alone) with some accuracy. Level 3 (5–6): explains a good range of relevant factors (the will, the Barrier fortresses, the Stuart recognition, the Grand Alliance) with accurate supporting detail. Level 4 (7–8): a well-substantiated, precise explanation of multiple interlinked factors, showing clear understanding of how Louis's specific choices after 1700 converted a succession dispute into full European war. Max 8 marks; credit valid alternative supporting detail.

This verdict deserves careful, balanced evaluation, since both French and allied weaknesses and Marlborough's own considerable generalship contributed genuinely to the Grand Alliance's military successes, though the specific timing and manner of key victories suggest Marlborough's personal contribution was more decisive than the verdict, taken at face value, allows.
The case for underlying French and allied weakness is real. Louis XIV's France, though still formidable, was fighting a war on multiple fronts simultaneously and bearing enormous financial strain after decades of near-continuous warfare stretching back to the 1660s; French finances deteriorated severely as the war progressed, and France's ally Bavaria, while militarily useful, added coordination difficulties rather than straightforward strength to the joint Franco-Bavarian war effort in southern Germany. By 1709, France faced a genuinely severe domestic crisis, as an exceptionally harsh winter produced widespread famine and economic distress, significantly weakening France's capacity to sustain the war effort and contributing to the extremely costly, narrowly Allied 'victory' (achieved at very high Allied casualties) at Malplaquet in September 1709.
However, Marlborough's own generalship was demonstrably decisive in converting these underlying French vulnerabilities into actual, timely battlefield success, rather than success following automatically from French weakness alone. His campaign of 1704 is the clearest example: recognising that a French and Bavarian advance threatened Vienna and could knock Austria out of the war, Marlborough conducted a famously bold and logistically demanding march of his army from the Low Countries to the Danube, deceiving French commanders about his true objective for much of the march, before combining with the Austrian commander Prince Eugene of Savoy to win a decisive victory over the Franco-Bavarian army at the Battle of Blenheim in August 1704 — a victory that owed as much to Marlborough's operational planning, march discipline and battlefield coordination with Eugene as to any prior French weakness, since the Franco-Bavarian force at Blenheim was a substantial, well-prepared army rather than an already-collapsing one. Marlborough's subsequent victories at Ramillies (1706) and Oudenarde (1708) similarly reflected his tactical flexibility and skilful handling of combined-arms battle, further demonstrating a personal command ability that cannot be reduced simply to exploiting pre-existing enemy weakness.
On balance, the verdict should be accepted only partially. French and allied weaknesses, particularly the severe financial and domestic strain evident by 1709, genuinely contributed to France's declining capacity to sustain the war in its later years, and comparable weaknesses were arguably present, to some degree, throughout the conflict. But the specific, decisive victories that established the Grand Alliance's military dominance, above all Blenheim in 1704, occurred against a still-substantial and capable enemy force and depended directly on Marlborough's own exceptional logistical planning, tactical judgement and effective coordination with allied commanders such as Eugene — qualities that cannot be attributed to French weakness alone, since a less capable Allied commander might well have failed to achieve comparable results even against the same underlying French and Bavarian vulnerabilities.
Final answer: the verdict should be accepted only in part — genuine French and allied weaknesses, especially the severe financial and domestic strain evident by 1709, contributed to the Grand Alliance's success, particularly in the war's later stages, but Marlborough's own generalship, most clearly demonstrated in the demanding 1704 march to the Danube and the resulting victory at Blenheim against a still-substantial Franco-Bavarian force, was decisive in converting underlying vulnerability into actual, well-timed battlefield victory, and cannot be reduced to a simple product of enemy weakness.

4-level mark scheme (22 marks). Level 1 (1–5): a basic, largely narrative or one-sided answer with little explicit evaluation of the proposition. Level 2 (6–11): some relevant factors relating to both French/allied weakness and Marlborough's generalship discussed with limited comparison or evaluation of their relative importance; a stated but underdeveloped judgement. Level 3 (12–17): a balanced, analytical discussion weighing French financial/domestic weakness (e.g. the 1709 famine) against Marlborough's specific achievements (the Danube march, Blenheim, Ramillies), supported by accurate evidence, with a reasoned judgement. Level 4 (18–22): a sophisticated, fully substantiated evaluation weighing both sides of the proposition with precise supporting evidence (e.g. the details of the 1704 campaign, coordination with Prince Eugene, the 1709 crisis and Malplaquet), reaching a clear, well-justified overall judgement about relative importance. Max 22 marks.