題目 1 · Data-Based Question
20 分Study the following sources and answer the questions that follow.
Source A: Adapted from a modern historical account of the Tang dynasty's military evolution.
> In the early Tang, the military foundation rested on the Garrison Militia System (Fubing). Soldiers engaged in farming during peacetime and performed rotational garrison duties and frontier service. However, by the reign of Emperor Xuanzong, the equal-field land distribution collapsed, leading to widespread desertion among militia households. In response, the court formally replaced the Fubing system with the Volunteer Recruitment System (Mubing / Kuozhi), establishing standing frontier defense commands under military commissioners (Jiedushi).
Source B: Table showing the distribution of military commands held by An Lushan in 755 CE.
| Military Command (Fanzhen) | Year Appointed | Approximate Troop Strength |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Pinglu | 742 CE | 37,500 |
| Fanyang | 744 CE | 91,400 |
| Hedong | 751 CE | 55,000 |
| Total Frontier Troops under An Lushan | — | 183,900 |
| Imperial Capital Defense Force (Chang'an) | — | ~80,000 (mostly ill-trained) |
Source C: Adapted from an analysis of the court politics during the Tianbao era.
> Emperor Xuanzong increasingly indulged in personal luxuries and neglected daily state affairs, delegating immense civil authority to Chief Minister Li Linfu. Fearing that prominent civil officials might achieve military merits at the borders and return to court to challenge his premiership, Li Linfu actively persuaded the Emperor to appoint illiterate non-Han (Hu) generals as military commissioners. Following Li's death, factional strife intensified between the new prime minister Yang Guozhong and An Lushan, precipitating an open military clash.
(a) According to Source A, identify the major reform in the military recruitment system under Emperor Xuanzong and explain ONE primary factor that led to this reform. (3 marks)
(b) Based on Source B, describe the strategic military imbalance between the frontier commands held by An Lushan and the Tang central court, and explain how this reflected the condition of "heavy on the perimeter and light at the center" (waizhong neiqing). (4 marks)
(c)
(i) According to Source C, identify the chief minister who advocated appointing non-Han (Hu) military commanders. (1 mark)
(ii) With reference to Source C and your historical knowledge, explain the political motives of this chief minister and the adverse consequences of this policy. (4 marks)
(d) "Emperor Xuanzong's governance errors in his later years, rather than structural military imbalance alone, were the decisive cause of the An-Shi Rebellion." To what extent do you agree with this statement? Justify your answer with reference to Sources A, B, and C, and your own historical knowledge. (8 marks)
Source A: Adapted from a modern historical account of the Tang dynasty's military evolution.
> In the early Tang, the military foundation rested on the Garrison Militia System (Fubing). Soldiers engaged in farming during peacetime and performed rotational garrison duties and frontier service. However, by the reign of Emperor Xuanzong, the equal-field land distribution collapsed, leading to widespread desertion among militia households. In response, the court formally replaced the Fubing system with the Volunteer Recruitment System (Mubing / Kuozhi), establishing standing frontier defense commands under military commissioners (Jiedushi).
Source B: Table showing the distribution of military commands held by An Lushan in 755 CE.
| Military Command (Fanzhen) | Year Appointed | Approximate Troop Strength |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Pinglu | 742 CE | 37,500 |
| Fanyang | 744 CE | 91,400 |
| Hedong | 751 CE | 55,000 |
| Total Frontier Troops under An Lushan | — | 183,900 |
| Imperial Capital Defense Force (Chang'an) | — | ~80,000 (mostly ill-trained) |
Source C: Adapted from an analysis of the court politics during the Tianbao era.
> Emperor Xuanzong increasingly indulged in personal luxuries and neglected daily state affairs, delegating immense civil authority to Chief Minister Li Linfu. Fearing that prominent civil officials might achieve military merits at the borders and return to court to challenge his premiership, Li Linfu actively persuaded the Emperor to appoint illiterate non-Han (Hu) generals as military commissioners. Following Li's death, factional strife intensified between the new prime minister Yang Guozhong and An Lushan, precipitating an open military clash.
(a) According to Source A, identify the major reform in the military recruitment system under Emperor Xuanzong and explain ONE primary factor that led to this reform. (3 marks)
(b) Based on Source B, describe the strategic military imbalance between the frontier commands held by An Lushan and the Tang central court, and explain how this reflected the condition of "heavy on the perimeter and light at the center" (waizhong neiqing). (4 marks)
(c)
(i) According to Source C, identify the chief minister who advocated appointing non-Han (Hu) military commanders. (1 mark)
(ii) With reference to Source C and your historical knowledge, explain the political motives of this chief minister and the adverse consequences of this policy. (4 marks)
(d) "Emperor Xuanzong's governance errors in his later years, rather than structural military imbalance alone, were the decisive cause of the An-Shi Rebellion." To what extent do you agree with this statement? Justify your answer with reference to Sources A, B, and C, and your own historical knowledge. (8 marks)
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解題
### Detailed Solution
(a)
- Institutional Reform: Transition from the Garrison Militia System (Fubing) to the Professional Volunteer Recruitment System (Mubing / Kuoqi / Changzhengjian).
- Underlying Reason: The collapse of the Equal-Field System (Juntianzhi). Land concentration and economic strain caused peasants to flee or lose land, undermining the economic basis required for Fubing soldiers to self-equip and perform rotational military duties.
(b)
- Strategic Imbalance: An Lushan concurrently held command over three major northern frontier commands (Pinglu, Fanyang, and Hedong), amassing nearly 184,000 elite, battle-hardened troops.
- *Waizhong Neiqing*: In contrast, the Tang central court and imperial guards stationed at the capital (Chang'an/Luoyang) numbered only around 80,000 troops, who were poorly trained market recruits and lacked combat experience. The frontier military strength greatly surpassed that of the central government, leaving the court vulnerable and unable to suppress a regional rebellion.
(c)
(i) Chief Minister: Li Linfu.
(ii) Motives & Consequences:
- Motives: Li Linfu sought to protect his monopoly on the position of prime minister. Under traditional Tang custom, civil officials who earned military glory at the frontiers were frequently promoted to the chief ministership (Chujiang Ruxiang). Non-Han generals, being mostly illiterate and considered ethnic outsiders, could not enter the civil court bureaucracy, thus eliminating potential political rivals to Li's position.
- Consequences: It enabled non-Han commanders like An Lushan, Gao Xianzhi, and Geshu Han to gain unmonitored command of immense frontier armies, severing the military's institutional loyalty to the civil central administration and directly enabling An Lushan's rebellion.
(d)
- Balanced Discussion:
- Argument supporting governance errors: Xuanzong grew complacent during the Tianbao era, indulging in romantic pursuits (Consort Yang Guifei) and Taoist rituals, abandoning the diligent governance of the Kaiyuan era. He misjudged loyalties by excessively trusting An Lushan, neglected court administration, and permitted violent rivalry between Yang Guozhong and An Lushan, which directly triggered the uprising in 755 CE.
- Argument emphasizing structural military weaknesses: The structural shift to the Mubing system granted Jiedushi sweeping administrative, fiscal, and military powers (caizheng, minzheng, bingquan in one hand), resulting in private armies (fazi) whose loyalty lay with their commanders rather than the dynasty. The severe numerical and qualitative disparity (waizhong neiqing) made rebellion militarily viable.
- Conclusion: Synthesis showing how structural flaws provided the capability and conditions for rebellion, while Xuanzong's personal neglect and political misjudgments served as the immediate catalyst.
(a)
- Institutional Reform: Transition from the Garrison Militia System (Fubing) to the Professional Volunteer Recruitment System (Mubing / Kuoqi / Changzhengjian).
- Underlying Reason: The collapse of the Equal-Field System (Juntianzhi). Land concentration and economic strain caused peasants to flee or lose land, undermining the economic basis required for Fubing soldiers to self-equip and perform rotational military duties.
(b)
- Strategic Imbalance: An Lushan concurrently held command over three major northern frontier commands (Pinglu, Fanyang, and Hedong), amassing nearly 184,000 elite, battle-hardened troops.
- *Waizhong Neiqing*: In contrast, the Tang central court and imperial guards stationed at the capital (Chang'an/Luoyang) numbered only around 80,000 troops, who were poorly trained market recruits and lacked combat experience. The frontier military strength greatly surpassed that of the central government, leaving the court vulnerable and unable to suppress a regional rebellion.
(c)
(i) Chief Minister: Li Linfu.
(ii) Motives & Consequences:
- Motives: Li Linfu sought to protect his monopoly on the position of prime minister. Under traditional Tang custom, civil officials who earned military glory at the frontiers were frequently promoted to the chief ministership (Chujiang Ruxiang). Non-Han generals, being mostly illiterate and considered ethnic outsiders, could not enter the civil court bureaucracy, thus eliminating potential political rivals to Li's position.
- Consequences: It enabled non-Han commanders like An Lushan, Gao Xianzhi, and Geshu Han to gain unmonitored command of immense frontier armies, severing the military's institutional loyalty to the civil central administration and directly enabling An Lushan's rebellion.
(d)
- Balanced Discussion:
- Argument supporting governance errors: Xuanzong grew complacent during the Tianbao era, indulging in romantic pursuits (Consort Yang Guifei) and Taoist rituals, abandoning the diligent governance of the Kaiyuan era. He misjudged loyalties by excessively trusting An Lushan, neglected court administration, and permitted violent rivalry between Yang Guozhong and An Lushan, which directly triggered the uprising in 755 CE.
- Argument emphasizing structural military weaknesses: The structural shift to the Mubing system granted Jiedushi sweeping administrative, fiscal, and military powers (caizheng, minzheng, bingquan in one hand), resulting in private armies (fazi) whose loyalty lay with their commanders rather than the dynasty. The severe numerical and qualitative disparity (waizhong neiqing) made rebellion militarily viable.
- Conclusion: Synthesis showing how structural flaws provided the capability and conditions for rebellion, while Xuanzong's personal neglect and political misjudgments served as the immediate catalyst.
評分準則
(a) [3 marks]
- Identifies the reform: From Fubing to Mubing / recruitment system (1 mark).
- Explains the underlying cause (e.g., collapse of the Juntian land system, peasant impoverishment/desertion, unviability of self-equipped militia) (2 marks).
(b) [4 marks]
- Describes An Lushan's military strength across three frontier commands (Pinglu, Fanyang, Hedong totaling ~184,000 elite troops) (2 marks).
- Explains waizhong neiqing by comparing frontier strength with the weak capital defense (~80,000 inexperienced guards), demonstrating the severe strategic vulnerability of the central court (2 marks).
(c)(i) [1 mark]
- Correctly names Li Linfu (1 mark).
(c)(ii) [4 marks]
- Political motives: Explains Li Linfu's fear of civil rivals earning military merits to replace him as Prime Minister (Chujiang Ruxiang); non-Han generals were illiterate and could not serve as chief ministers (2 marks).
- Adverse consequences: Fostered autonomous military warlords with no loyalty to the court; concentrated unchecked military power in An Lushan's hands (2 marks).
(d) [8 marks]
- Level 4 (7–8 marks): Comprehensive and balanced analysis. Effectively integrates evidence from Sources A, B, and C with substantial historical knowledge. Thoroughly examines both Emperor Xuanzong's governance errors (neglect of affairs, favoritism towards Consort Yang/Yang Guozhong, blind trust in An Lushan) and structural military factors (waizhong neiqing, Jiedushi system, collapse of Fubing). Clear stance, coherent organization, and strong argumentation.
- Level 3 (5–6 marks): Good analysis addressing both personal and structural factors, referencing sources and historical facts, though discussion of one aspect may be slightly more detailed than the other.
- Level 2 (3–4 marks): General analysis with limited historical elaboration, mainly paraphrasing source materials without sufficient depth.
- Level 1 (1–2 marks): Brief, one-sided, or inaccurate response with minimal supporting evidence.
- 0 marks: Irrelevant response or blank.
- Identifies the reform: From Fubing to Mubing / recruitment system (1 mark).
- Explains the underlying cause (e.g., collapse of the Juntian land system, peasant impoverishment/desertion, unviability of self-equipped militia) (2 marks).
(b) [4 marks]
- Describes An Lushan's military strength across three frontier commands (Pinglu, Fanyang, Hedong totaling ~184,000 elite troops) (2 marks).
- Explains waizhong neiqing by comparing frontier strength with the weak capital defense (~80,000 inexperienced guards), demonstrating the severe strategic vulnerability of the central court (2 marks).
(c)(i) [1 mark]
- Correctly names Li Linfu (1 mark).
(c)(ii) [4 marks]
- Political motives: Explains Li Linfu's fear of civil rivals earning military merits to replace him as Prime Minister (Chujiang Ruxiang); non-Han generals were illiterate and could not serve as chief ministers (2 marks).
- Adverse consequences: Fostered autonomous military warlords with no loyalty to the court; concentrated unchecked military power in An Lushan's hands (2 marks).
(d) [8 marks]
- Level 4 (7–8 marks): Comprehensive and balanced analysis. Effectively integrates evidence from Sources A, B, and C with substantial historical knowledge. Thoroughly examines both Emperor Xuanzong's governance errors (neglect of affairs, favoritism towards Consort Yang/Yang Guozhong, blind trust in An Lushan) and structural military factors (waizhong neiqing, Jiedushi system, collapse of Fubing). Clear stance, coherent organization, and strong argumentation.
- Level 3 (5–6 marks): Good analysis addressing both personal and structural factors, referencing sources and historical facts, though discussion of one aspect may be slightly more detailed than the other.
- Level 2 (3–4 marks): General analysis with limited historical elaboration, mainly paraphrasing source materials without sufficient depth.
- Level 1 (1–2 marks): Brief, one-sided, or inaccurate response with minimal supporting evidence.
- 0 marks: Irrelevant response or blank.