2023 CCEA AS-Level Religious Studies 4610 模擬試題連答案詳解

The ontological argument is unique among the classical arguments for God's existence in being an entirely a priori, deductive argument: rather than reasoning from observed features of the world (as the cosmological and teleological arguments do), it attempts to derive God's existence directly from the very definition or concept of God.

The argument originates with Anselm of Canterbury in his Proslogion (1078). Anselm begins from a definition of God as 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' — the greatest possible being conceivable. He then argues that even someone who denies God's existence (the 'fool' of Psalm 14) must have this concept of God in their mind, since they understand what is being denied. Anselm then argues that a being which exists both in the mind and in reality is greater than a being which exists in the mind alone; therefore, if 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' existed only in the mind, one could conceive of a greater being — one that also existed in reality — which is a contradiction, since nothing greater than 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' can, by definition, be conceived. It follows, for Anselm, that God must exist in reality and not merely as an idea. In Proslogion 3, Anselm develops a second, related form of the argument, arguing that a being whose non-existence is inconceivable (a being with necessary existence) is greater than a being that merely happens to exist (contingent existence); since God is the greatest conceivable being, God's existence must be necessary rather than contingent, meaning God cannot fail to exist. Anselm anticipated objections to his argument, notably from the monk Gaunilo, who proposed the parallel case of a 'Lost Island' — the greatest conceivable island — arguing that Anselm's logic would absurdly prove such an island must exist; Anselm responded that the argument works uniquely for God as the greatest conceivable being in every category, not for a greatest conceivable member of a finite, limited category such as islands.

Descartes reformulated the argument in his Fifth Meditation (1641), using different but related reasoning. Descartes argued that certain concepts have properties that necessarily belong to them by definition — a valid triangle, for example, necessarily has interior angles summing to two right angles, and one cannot coherently conceive of a triangle lacking this property while still calling it a triangle. Descartes argued that existence functions similarly as a necessary predicate of the concept of God: since God is defined as a supremely perfect being, and existence is itself a perfection (it is greater to exist than not to exist), a supremely perfect being cannot lack the perfection of existence without ceasing to be supremely perfect. To conceive of God as not existing would therefore be as incoherent, for Descartes, as conceiving of a triangle whose angles do not sum to two right angles, or a mountain without a valley.

Both Anselm and Descartes therefore share the core strategy of treating existence (or necessary existence) as logically inseparable from the very concept of a supremely perfect or greatest conceivable being, making the argument formally deductive: if the definition of God is accepted, God's existence appears to follow with logical necessity, independent of any empirical observation of the world.

Band-of-response marking (25 marks). Band 1 (1–4): Basic, fragmentary knowledge of the ontological argument; little or no reference to Anselm or Descartes; weak written communication. Band 2 (5–8): Limited knowledge, perhaps naming Anselm and/or Descartes but with little accurate detail of the argument's structure; adequate written communication. Band 3 (9–12): Reasonable, generally accurate account of the ontological argument with some reference to both Anselm and Descartes, though development may be uneven; adequate use of specialist vocabulary. Band 4 (13–16): Good, accurate knowledge of both Anselm's and Descartes' formulations, with clear explanation of the a priori, deductive character of the argument and some reference to objections such as Gaunilo's; clear organisation. Band 5 (17–20 base range; extended to 25 for exceptional responses): Comprehensive, precise and well-organised knowledge of both formulations of the argument, using accurate technical vocabulary (a priori, necessary existence, contingent existence) and demonstrating sophisticated understanding of the logical structure and its reformulations. Max 25 marks.

The Irenaean theodicy, tracing its roots to the second-century theologian Irenaeus and substantially developed in the twentieth century by John Hick, offers a distinctive response to the problem of evil by arguing that evil and suffering are not merely tolerated but are, in a real sense, necessary for humanity's proper development.

On this view, humans were created imperfect, in the 'image' of God but not yet in God's 'likeness', and must grow into that likeness through their own free responses to a world that includes real moral and natural evil. Hick's development, often called 'soul-making' theodicy, argues that God deliberately maintains an 'epistemic distance' from humanity — God's existence is not overwhelmingly obvious — so that human moral choices can be genuinely free rather than coerced by an undeniable divine presence. On this view, a world containing real dangers, real temptations and real suffering is a better environment for developing courage, compassion, patience and love than a comfortable, risk-free paradise would be; Hick further argues that any resulting suffering will ultimately be outweighed by an eschatological resolution in which all persons are brought, through a process potentially extending beyond this life, to a state of genuine relationship with God.

This theodicy has genuine strengths. It offers a coherent explanation for why an all-loving, all-powerful God might permit a world with real evil rather than intervening to prevent it, addressing both moral evil (necessary for genuine free will and moral growth) and natural evil (necessary for a world with stable, learnable laws in which challenges and dangers exist). It also fits certain strands of biblical and Christian tradition emphasising trial, testing and spiritual maturation, and Hick's addition of universal ultimate salvation addresses a common objection that a genuinely loving God would not permit any person's suffering to go unredeemed.

However, the theodicy faces serious and, on balance, decisive difficulties. Most significantly, it struggles to explain the sheer scale and severity of suffering in the world, much of which appears to destroy rather than develop character — the suffering of infants who die before any capacity for moral growth, or of animals, who (on most accounts) lack the moral agency the theodicy requires to benefit from suffering at all, seems to fall entirely outside its explanatory scope. Critics such as Dostoyevsky (through the character of Ivan Karamazov) have argued forcefully that no future good, however great, can justify or 'balance the books' against the suffering of an innocent child, since this treats that child's suffering merely as a means to others' or their own eventual growth, an instrumentalization many find morally troubling in itself. Furthermore, Hick's insistence on eventual universal salvation, while addressing one objection, arguably undermines the theodicy's central claim that suffering is genuinely necessary: if all persons will ultimately be saved regardless of how they respond to suffering in this life, it becomes unclear why so much specific, severe and unequally distributed suffering is required for that outcome, rather than a substantially gentler world achieving the same ultimate result. The stark disproportion between the suffering some individuals endure and the soul-making benefit they could plausibly derive from it — a starving infant gains no moral education from their death — is a critique that remains largely unanswered.

On balance, while the Irenaean and Hickian theodicy offers a thoughtful and internally coherent framework for understanding some forms of suffering as purposeful, it does not convincingly account for the scale, severity and often morally arbitrary distribution of the worst suffering in the world, particularly suffering endured by those incapable of the moral growth the theodicy requires. The claim that it provides an unconvincing response to the problem of evil should, on balance, be accepted.

Band-of-response marking (25 marks). Band 1 (1–4): Basic, largely descriptive response with little genuine evaluation; weak written communication. Band 2 (5–8): Limited critical analysis, perhaps outlining the Irenaean theodicy without meaningful assessment of the claim; adequate written communication. Band 3 (9–12): Reasonable evaluation with some balanced discussion of strengths and weaknesses (e.g. soul-making versus the suffering of infants/animals), reaching a basic conclusion; adequate use of specialist vocabulary. Band 4 (13–16): Good, well-developed critical evaluation engaging directly with the claim, using relevant scholarly reference points (e.g. Hick, Dostoyevsky/Ivan Karamazov) and reaching a justified conclusion; clear organisation. Band 5 (17–20 base range; extended to 25 for exceptional responses): Sophisticated, sustained critical evaluation that directly and repeatedly engages the claim, weighs strong counter-arguments on both sides with precision, and reaches a well-substantiated, independently argued conclusion; excellent use of specialist vocabulary and structure throughout. Max 25 marks.

Natural Moral Law is a deontological (duty-based, absolutist) approach to ethics, meaning that actions are judged as intrinsically right or wrong in themselves, according to fixed moral rules, rather than by their consequences. Its classical formulation is found in the work of Thomas Aquinas, who built on Aristotle's teleological view that everything in nature has a proper purpose or end (telos) toward which it is naturally oriented.

For Aquinas, human beings possess a fixed rational nature, created and ordered by God, and moral goodness consists in acting in accordance with that nature's proper ends. Aquinas identified certain 'primary precepts' — self-evident basic goods that all rational people naturally pursue — which he summarised as: to preserve life, to reproduce and educate offspring, to live in an ordered society, and to worship God (to know and love truth, including ultimate truth). These primary precepts are held to be universal and unchanging, discoverable by reason (a faculty Aquinas calls synderesis, the innate grasp of basic moral principles) rather than dependent on revelation alone, meaning Natural Law can in principle be recognised by believers and non-believers alike.

From these primary precepts, more specific 'secondary precepts' are derived through practical reasoning applied to particular circumstances — for example, the primary precept to preserve life generates secondary precepts against murder, and the primary precept to live in an ordered society generates secondary precepts concerning justice and the keeping of promises. Aquinas distinguishes between 'real' goods, which genuinely fulfil human nature's proper ends, and merely 'apparent' goods, which may be desired but do not, in reality, fulfil those ends — moral error, on this account, often arises from mistaking an apparent good for a real one.

A key interpretive tool within Natural Law is the doctrine of double effect, which permits an action that has one good and one foreseen but unintended bad effect, provided the action itself is not intrinsically wrong, the good effect is not achieved through the bad effect, and there is a proportionately serious reason for permitting the bad effect — this allows, for example, the administration of pain relief that may hasten death as a foreseen but unintended side-effect, while still prohibiting the same outcome if death itself were the intended means.

Because Natural Law identifies certain acts (such as directly killing an innocent person) as intrinsically and always wrong, regardless of the good consequences that might follow, it stands as a paradigm case of a deontological, absolutist ethical theory, in clear contrast to teleological, consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism and situation ethics, which judge the rightness of an action primarily or entirely by its outcomes.

Band-of-response marking (25 marks). Band 1 (1–4): Basic, fragmentary knowledge of Natural Law; weak written communication. Band 2 (5–8): Limited knowledge, perhaps naming Aquinas or the primary precepts without accurate detail; adequate written communication. Band 3 (9–12): Reasonable, generally accurate account of Natural Law's key principles, with some reference to primary/secondary precepts, though development may be uneven; adequate specialist vocabulary. Band 4 (13–16): Good, accurate knowledge of Aquinas's framework including primary and secondary precepts and the doctrine of double effect, with clear explanation of its deontological character; clear organisation. Band 5 (17–20 base range; extended to 25 for exceptional responses): Comprehensive, precise and well-organised knowledge, using accurate technical vocabulary (telos, synderesis, real/apparent goods, double effect) and demonstrating sophisticated understanding of how Natural Law functions as a deontological system. Max 25 marks.

The question of whether legalising voluntary euthanasia would, on balance, respect or threaten human dignity and autonomy touches directly on religious ethics, medical practice, law and lived human experience, and requires weighing genuinely competing considerations.

The case for the claim draws on the principle of personal autonomy — the idea that competent individuals have the right to make fundamental decisions about their own lives and, arguably, their own deaths, especially when facing terminal illness accompanied by severe, unrelievable suffering. Secular ethicists such as utilitarian writers have argued that respecting a person's own assessment of their quality of life, rather than imposing continued suffering upon them, better serves both autonomy and compassion; documented cases such as that of Diane Pretty, who campaigned unsuccessfully in the UK courts for the right to an assisted death while suffering from motor neurone disease, and Tony Nicklinson, who suffered from locked-in syndrome, have given this argument real force in public and legal debate, illustrating genuine, lived experiences of individuals who felt that being denied control over the manner and timing of their death was itself an assault on their dignity. Some liberal Christian voices likewise argue that a God who values compassion and human freedom would not require the prolongation of pointless suffering against a person's clearly and freely expressed wishes.

However, substantial evidence and argument challenge the claim. The sanctity of life principle, central to mainstream Christian ethics (and reflected across many religious traditions), holds that human life possesses inherent, God-given value that cannot be forfeited by illness or suffering, meaning that deliberately ending a life — even at the person's own request — undermines rather than respects human dignity, however sincerely autonomy is invoked. The acts and omissions doctrine, still influential in law and medical ethics, distinguishes between allowing death (through withdrawing or withholding treatment) and actively causing death, arguing that only the latter constitutes a moral and legal wrong regardless of intention. Evidence from jurisdictions that have legalised assisted dying or euthanasia, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, has fuelled 'slippery slope' concerns: eligibility criteria have in some cases expanded over time beyond terminal illness to include psychiatric suffering, raising real concerns about whether truly vulnerable people — the elderly, the disabled, or those experiencing depression or feeling like a burden on family or the health system — might feel pressured toward euthanasia in ways that reflect social and family pressure rather than genuinely free autonomy. The doctor–patient relationship of trust, central to good medical care, may also be damaged if physicians are understood as potential agents of death rather than exclusively of healing, an argument that has shaped strong opposition from many medical bodies. The hospice and palliative care movement, associated particularly with Cicely Saunders, offers an alternative vision in which dignity at the end of life is protected not through legalised killing but through comprehensive pain relief and holistic care, addressing much of the suffering that motivates euthanasia requests without the risks legalisation would introduce.

On balance, while the claim correctly identifies a genuine and important value — respect for individual autonomy in the most personal of decisions — the weight of countervailing evidence regarding risks to vulnerable people, damage to trust in medical relationships, and the sanctity of life principle central to much religious and secular ethical thought means the claim should only be partly accepted: legalisation would likely enhance dignity and autonomy for some competent, clear-minded individuals in the manner Diane Pretty's case illustrates, but the threat it poses to the dignity and safety of more vulnerable members of society is serious enough that it cannot be said, without significant qualification, to do simply 'more' to respect dignity than to threaten it.

Band-of-response marking (25 marks). Band 1 (0–5): Basic/minimal response; no meaningful reference to other aspects of human experience. Band 2 (6–10): Limited knowledge and critical analysis; other aspects of human experience, if present, are undeveloped — this is the mandatory ceiling if other aspects of human experience are genuinely absent. Band 3 (11–15): Good/reasonable response with some engagement with other aspects of human experience (e.g. legal cases, medical practice, the hospice movement), reaching a basic justified conclusion. Band 4 (16–20): Very good understanding and evaluation, mature structure, clear and sustained engagement with other aspects of human experience (e.g. Diane Pretty, Tony Nicklinson, jurisdictions that have legalised assisted dying), clear justification of the conclusion. Band 5 (21–25): Comprehensive/excellent critical analysis, sophisticated structure, extensive and well-integrated engagement with other aspects of human experience, substantiated and independently argued conclusion, extensive technical vocabulary. Max 25 marks.