Welcome to Meta-ethics!

In your study of Moral Philosophy so far, you have looked at Normative Ethics (like Utilitarianism or Kantian Ethics), which asks "What should I do?" or "Which actions are right?".

Meta-ethics is different. It doesn’t ask which actions are right; it asks what "right" actually means. It is the "philosophy of ethics." We are stepping back to look at the foundations of moral language and the origins of moral principles: do they come from reason, emotion and attitudes, or society? Think of it like this: Normative ethics is like playing a game of football and arguing over the rules; Meta-ethics is asking "What even is a 'rule' and do they actually exist?"

Don't worry if this seems a bit "heady" at first! We will break it down into the two main camps: those who think moral facts are real (Realists) and those who don't (Anti-realists).


1. The Big Divide: Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism

Before we dive into specific theories, we need to understand the two ways philosophers view moral language.

Cognitivism

Cognitivists believe that when we make a moral statement (like "Stealing is wrong"), we are expressing a belief. Beliefs can be true or false (this is called being "truth-apt"). For a cognitivist, moral claims are trying to describe mind-independent reality.

Non-Cognitivism

Non-cognitivists argue that moral statements are not beliefs. They aren't trying to describe facts, so they cannot be true or false. Instead, they might be expressions of emotion, orders, or social attitudes.

Quick Review Box:
• Cognitivism: Moral claims = Beliefs = Can be True/False.
• Non-Cognitivism: Moral claims = Not Beliefs = Cannot be True/False.


2. Moral Realism (The "Facts" Crowd)

Moral Realism is a cognitivist view. Realists believe that there are mind-independent moral properties or facts in the world. Just like "The sky is blue" is a fact, "Murder is wrong" is an objective fact for a realist.

Moral Naturalism

Naturalists believe moral properties are reducible to or identical with natural properties that we can discover through empirical observation or science.

  • Utilitarianism: Reductively identifies "Good" with a natural psychological state like pleasure or happiness. Since pleasure is measurable in the natural world, goodness is a natural fact.
  • Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: Interpreted naturally, "Good" is linked to eudaimonia (human flourishing) and our biological/social nature as rational animals.

Moral Non-Naturalism (Intuitionism)

G.E. Moore argued that naturalists make a fundamental mistake. He said you cannot define "Good" using natural terms like "pleasure" or "flourishing." This is known as the Naturalistic Fallacy.

The Open Question Argument: Moore says if "Good" really meant "Pleasure," then asking "Is pleasure good?" would be a closed, tautological question like asking "Is an unmarried man a bachelor?". But "Is pleasure good?" remains a meaningful, open question. Therefore, "Good" and "Pleasure" cannot be the exact same concept.

Moore’s solution? Intuitionism. He says "Good" is a simple, non-natural, unanalysable property that we directly grasp through a rational moral intuition.
Analogy: You can't explain the color "yellow" to a blind person by breaking it down into definitions; you just know it directly when you see it. Moore says "Good" is just like "Yellow"—it is indefinable and directly intuited.

Key Takeaway: Realists think moral facts exist. Naturalists say they are natural properties; Non-naturalists (like Moore) say they are unique, non-natural properties known by intuition.


3. Issues for Moral Realism

Philosophers have raised serious epistemological and metaphysical challenges to the idea of mind-independent moral facts.

Hume’s Fork

Hume argued that all objects of human reason fall into two categories:

  1. Relations of Ideas: Analytic, a priori truths (e.g., mathematical statements like 2+2=4).
  2. Matters of Fact: Synthetic, a posteriori truths that can be tested by experience (e.g., "It is raining").
Moral claims like "Murder is wrong" are not analytic definitions, nor can moral "wrongness" be observed empirically. Therefore, for Hume, moral judgements are not statements of fact at all.

Hume’s Motivation Argument

Hume also argues that moral judgements inherently motivate us to act. However, according to Hume, reason alone can never motivate the will—only desires and passions can move us to act. Since beliefs (reason) are inert and cannot motivate on their own, moral judgements cannot be cognitive beliefs; they must stem from our feelings and passions.

The Is-Ought Gap

In his Treatise, Hume observed that writers frequently move from descriptive premises about what is or is not the case to prescriptive conclusions about what ought or ought not to be done without any justification. Hume argues you cannot logically deduce an "ought" from an "is" without introducing a new moral value.

Mackie’s Arguments Against Realism

John Mackie presents two major arguments against moral realism:

  1. The Argument from Relativity: Cross-cultural moral disagreements are widespread and persistent. Mackie argues that these differences are better explained by people participating in different social ways of life rather than by cultures having varying, flawed perceptions of objective moral facts.
  2. The Argument from Queerness:
    • Metaphysical Queerness: If objective moral values existed, they would have to be bizarre entities with built-in "to-be-pursuedness" that intrinsically motivate anyone who encounters them.
    • Epistemological Queerness: To know such weird non-natural entities, we would require a mysterious, inexplicable faculty of moral intuition.

4. Moral Anti-Realism (The "No Facts" Crowd)

Anti-realists believe there are no mind-independent moral properties. When we talk about morality, we are doing something other than discovering objective facts.

Error Theory (John Mackie)

Mackie is a cognitivist but an anti-realist:
He argues that our moral statements linguistically claim objective truth (Cognitivism), but because objective moral values do not exist, all positive moral assertions are systematically false.
Analogy: It’s like talking about witches or phlogiston. Statements like "That witch cast a spell" aim to state facts, but because witches do not exist, the statement is false.

Emotivism (A.J. Ayer)

Ayer is a non-cognitivist who applied the logical positivist Verification Principle: a proposition is meaningful only if it is an analytic tautology or empirically verifiable.
Because moral claims are neither, they lack factual meaning. Instead, they serve as non-cognitive expressions of feeling and attitude.
The "Boo/Hurrah" Theory:
"Stealing is wrong" = "Boo to stealing!" (expressing disapproval)
"Giving to charity is good" = "Hurrah for charity!" (expressing approval)

Prescriptivism (R.M. Hare)

Hare argued that moral statements are more than mere emotional vents; they are prescriptive imperatives designed to guide action.
When I say "Stealing is wrong," I am prescribing a universal imperative: "Do not steal!". Moral judgements must be universalizable, meaning if I prescribe an action in one situation, I commit myself to prescribing the same in all relevantly similar situations.

Key Takeaway: Anti-realists reject objective moral facts. Mackie says our moral claims aim at facts but always fail; Ayer says they express emotions; Hare says they issue universalized prescriptions.


5. Issues for Moral Anti-Realism

If there are no objective moral facts, anti-realist theories face major challenges:

  • Can we have moral disagreement? If moral statements are just emotional expressions or personal prescriptions, moral debates become clashes of preference rather than rational arguments about facts.
  • Moral Progress: We intuitively believe that societal changes (such as abolishing slavery) represent genuine moral progress. But without an objective standard of "good" to move toward, changes over time are merely shifts in cultural attitudes, not improvements.
  • Moral Nihilism: If no mind-independent moral values exist, does this lead to nihilism—the rejection of all moral values and duties? Anti-realists must explain why moral standards still retain practical authority and social importance.

Summary Checklist

Don't forget these key concepts for your exam:

  1. Origins of Morality: Moral principles traced to reason, emotion/attitudes, or society.
  2. Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism: Whether moral claims express truth-apt beliefs or non-truth-apt attitudes.
  3. Moral Naturalism: Identifying moral properties with natural facts (e.g., Utilitarianism, Virtue Ethics).
  4. Non-Naturalism / Intuitionism: Moore's view that "good" is indefinable and known via intuition.
  5. Hume's Fork & Is-Ought Gap: The logical limits of deriving moral "oughts" from factual "is" statements.
  6. Mackie's Error Theory: Cognitivist anti-realism supported by arguments from relativity and queerness.
  7. Ayer's Emotivism & Hare's Prescriptivism: Non-cognitivist accounts of moral language as emotion or prescription.